Theology and labels

[John Charmley]

NOTE: This post was originally made to the Original Sin thread (http://www.monachos.net/forum/showthread.php?t=3128), but has been moved here to start a new thread on this interesting theme. To see the post in its original context, click here (http://www.monachos.net/forum/showpost.php?p=38775&postcount=14).



Indeed, many go so far as to call this 'Augustinian Original Sin'; though I always find this somewhat unfair to Augustine, since he tended to treat the subject in less static and concrete terms than do most people who 'follow his thought' today ('an Augustinianism that would cause Augustine to roll over in his grave', as one scholar has termed it)


Thank you for your very interesting comments, which, taken with those of Fr. Raphael, provides much in the way of illumination.

I cite the passage above because I wonder whether there is something in it we might explore - namely the question of labels.

One of the tropes of modern scholarship is to emphasise complexity and nuance, and with it the inadequacy of traditional labels. Augustine was not Augustinian, Nestorius was not Nestorian, the Antiochene School was neither Antiochene nor a 'school', and the same applies, mutatis mutandis, to that of Alexandria; indeed, if St. Cyril's thought can be accepted as Cyrilline, that is only by virtue of its suppleness and complexity. Along the same line of thought we see that the 'Monophysites' were not monosphysite, and the diophysites were not diophysite.

In good scholarly fashion we quietly emphasise the nuanced nature of what is being read and what was written (not, of course, always the same thing), and thus help to dissolve old barriers and, with good fortune, to build new bridges. We seek to broaden and deepen understanding by promoting renewed attention to what was written, rather than accepting what has been written about what was written - or so it might seem.

At times this can appear unsettling to those whose access to patristics and theology has come through older traditions of writing and thinking about these things; it may even, at times, appear as though one is being as paradoxical as St. Cyril himself, who liked the challenge of saying that God suffered in his impassibility, and was much misunderstood thereby, not least by those who could not follow his train and type of thought.

But even as we suggest more nuanced and subtle way of reading the Fathers, we come back to the question of what that means. St. Augustine's works are so voluminous that few scholars could claim to have read them all; much of the discussion of his thought centres around a corpus of familiar texts - and even then we can say that he is revered in Orthodoxy for his example rather than his theology. As you have pointed out, Matthew, St. Cyril has been more read of late than at any time since his own time, except, perhaps, in certain parts of the Alexandrian tradition.

Two questions follow from this sketch of a train of thought:

- as we question old labels, do we need to think of providing new ones? After all, labels are there for a reason.

- as access to the works of the Fathers becomes easier than it has ever been, do we see the teachings of the Fathers more fully than has been possible hithertofore?


INXC

John

[M.C. Steenberg]

Dear John,

Thank you for this; there are some very interesting questions in your post.

I'm a rather active questioner of labels, partially on grounds that they generally try to make to 'tidy' realities that are often quite complex, fluid and dynamic in their articulation than simple cut-and-dry categories often provide. Perhaps one of the best examples of a 'standard category' that's come to be challenged in a wide-scale way over the past twenty years is that of 'Nestorianism', for which the consensus is fairly clear today that Nestorius himself would not have qualified. More recently, 'Arianism' has come under careful spectacles, with many scholars suggesting it too ought to be done away with. And so also 'Gnosticism', which as a label has lost considerable credibility (though it still has some champions).

The main thing to keep in mind when addressing categories and labels, from my perspective, is that they do in fact serve a purpose. There are trends and modes of theological thought, and it is helpful to identify them. Perhaps the people we tend to call 'Arians' did not in fact follow Arius; but surely there is something that binds them. The groups normally called 'Gnostics' may not, in the end, have laid much (or any) focus on gnosis, but modern scholarship is far from the first to identify a common theme across them.

The danger is in adopting labels that assign individuals to a thought not their own (the most notable here being 'Nestorianism' which, if taken to mean something akin to a two-Sons Christology, Nestorius certainly never espoused; 'Arianism' depends on what one means - if one takes it to mean a doctrine that the Son is not divine, Arius clearly wasn't an Arian; if one takes it to mean the Son is a creature, then he is); or which attempt to homogenise groups along demonstrably false lines (e.g. 'Gnosticism'). Surely there are more appropriate labels than simply the his-or-hers identifiers, which is basically what Nestorianism / Arianism / etc. are.

But one can't do away with categories altogether. The urge to deconstruct can sometimes be overwhelming. But the fathers themselves use categories or trajectories of thought in their own conceptions of theology and doctrinal articulation; and finding currents of thought or consideration is part of what draws out theological meaning in conversation.

Just some initial reactions. I look forward to reading the thoughts of others.

INXC, Matthew

[Fr Raphael Vereshack]

Dear John,

Thank you for this; there are some very interesting questions in your post.

I'm a rather active questioner of labels, partially on grounds that they generally try to make to 'tidy' realities that are often quite complex, fluid and dynamic in their articulation than simple cut-and-dry categories often provide. Perhaps one of the best examples of a 'standard category' that's come to be challenged in a wide-scale way over the past twenty years is that of 'Nestorianism', for which the consensus is fairly clear today that Nestorius himself would not have qualified. More recently, 'Arianism' has come under careful spectacles, with many scholars suggesting it too ought to be done away with. And so also 'Gnosticism', which as a label has lost considerable credibility (though it still has some champions).

The main thing to keep in mind when addressing categories and labels, from my perspective, is that they do in fact serve a purpose. There are trends and modes of theological thought, and it is helpful to identify them. Perhaps the people we tend to call 'Arians' did not in fact follow Arius; but surely there is something that binds them. The groups normally called 'Gnostics' may not, in the end, have laid much (or any) focus on gnosis, but modern scholarship is far from the first to identify a common theme across them.

The danger is in adopting labels that assign individuals to a thought not their own (the most notable here being 'Nestorianism' which, if taken to mean something akin to a two-Sons Christology, Nestorius certainly never espoused; 'Arianism' depends on what one means - if one takes it to mean a doctrine that the Son is not divine, Arius clearly wasn't an Arian; if one takes it to mean the Son is a creature, then he is); or which attempt to homogenise groups along demonstrably false lines (e.g. 'Gnosticism'). Surely there are more appropriate labels than simply the his-or-hers identifiers, which is basically what Nestorianism / Arianism / etc. are.

But one can't do away with categories altogether. The urge to deconstruct can sometimes be overwhelming. But the fathers themselves use categories or trajectories of thought in their own conceptions of theology and doctrinal articulation; and finding currents of thought or consideration is part of what draws out theological meaning in conversation.

Just some initial reactions. I look forward to reading the thoughts of others.

INXC, Matthew

Dear Matthew,

I believe that what you have written above about labels is very helpful. The danger is that they can present too neatly what was something complex as with Nestorianism & Arianism. But also as you say these labels do serve a useful purpose.

I would go one stage further however and point out that what is being labelled is what the Church has found inimical to its own way of thinking and is heretical.

Here something interesting occurs which instead of labels I prefer to call a 'Church shorthand' for describing heresy. On the one hand the detail of, let's say Arius, is different from the Arius whom is described as having said that Christ is a creature. The latter Arius does not appear to match up with what Arius actually wrote or perhaps intended.

But the point I think is that the Church is concerned not only with the personal intent of a theologian or what they wrote or said. Rather the Church always discerns concerning the theological implications of what someone has written or said.

It's from this I think that the Church develops it's 'shorthand' for example about Arius. This shorthand appears throughout the canonical statements of the Church, the theological writings of the Fathers & also Church hymnography. And by far most of what has been presented to the faithful throughout the 2000 years of the Church is this shorthand.

Not that this in itself makes the shorthand correct. But I think this does point to how the Church has conveyed Her message for the most part & that it does contain important truths about the Church.

Even though there can appear to be a contradiction between the details we discover from investigation and the Church's shorthand, in reality the two are connected by the way in which the Church always discerns according to what is consistent with its own life. Thus in the case of Arius we not only have what he wrote or even what he intended to express through his writings- we also have the significance, in this case negative, which the Church finds in these writings.

Indeed this is consistent with how the Church through its entire way of discernment judges not simply in terms of what we may say or intend. Rather the discernment of the Church precisely goes one step further and is defined by showing us the significance of what is said or intended. And I would say that it is this which provides the key to explaining the meaning of the Church's shorthand.

In Christ- Fr Raphael

[Peter Farrington]

Dear Father

I agree to some extent, but if Nestorius was not a Nestorian then it is untrue, and therefore not of God, to accuse him of a two Sons Christology. The truth requires us to be accurate. The Holy Spirit requires us to be accurate. It does matter.

I am happy talking about Theodoreanism because both Theodoret and Nestorius were dependent on Theodore, but if Nestorius did not believe what is imputed to him then surely whatever the aim in view if the Church chooses to describe Nestorianism as we classically understand it, it is not just to impute it casually and carelessly to a man who did not espouse it.

Ironically Nestorius is as guilty in his presentation of Eutyches, who was undoubtedly in error in his Christology but never proposed that the humanity of Christ came from heaven or was swallowed up like drop in the ocean,

Or we could consider Pelagius and Pelagianism, probably Augustine and Augustinianism, to mention just a few other attributions of real errors unjustly to real people.

This is not to say that Nestorius also did not have a weak and defective Christology, but you seem to be saying that the ends justify the means. I don't think I can agree. Nestorius should be criticised for what he really believed - and of course he considered the Tome to describe his Christology so it is not a simple matter. Nestorianism should perhaps be given a non-personal label - two Sons Christology for instance. Then we can ask more appropriately whether the Church of the East, as an example, has a two Sons Christology, and indeed whether Nestorius has, and Matthew has already indicated that it seems quite clear he did not.

I do agree entirely with you, and Matthew, that the labels do communicate a real content. Indeed I have no problem condemning Eutychianism and Monophysitism as errors. But Christians seem to go wrong when they then impute real errors to people without taking enough time to understand if they hold to those errors, or some others, or none at all.

I still find it too easy entirely to consider the Church of the East to be Nestorian, it is sort of a gut reaction, but the more I read the more unjust I know my gut reaction is. There may well be other errors in the Church of the East Christology, I am not sure, but to casually call them Nestorian when they manifestly reject such a gross heresy, as Nestorius did, even if it is shorthand for some other issue, just seems wrong because it is not true, and the Word is the Truth.

Best wishes

Peter

[Fr Raphael Vereshack]

Dear Peter,

I've narrowed down the following quotes from your post. This basically gets to the point of what I am trying to address:



I agree to some extent, but if Nestorius was not a Nestorian then it is untrue, and therefore not of God, to accuse him of a two Sons Christology. The truth requires us to be accurate. The Holy Spirit requires us to be accurate. It does matter.

I am happy talking about Theodoreanism because both Theodoret and Nestorius were dependent on Theodore, but if Nestorius did not believe what is imputed to him then surely whatever the aim in view if the Church chooses to describe Nestorianism as we classically understand it, it is not just to impute it casually and carelessly to a man who did not espouse it.

Here's an analogy of what I am trying to get at:

Pick anything which a particular person may do which he/she believes is right. The Church however knows what is being done is wrong.

What is going on here?

In a sense the Church takes into account what the person believes is true but in an even larger sense the Church follows its own sense of right & wrong. This is not pretending what the person believed never was or even overlooking this. Rather it extends the way in which the Church always and in all things discerns the implications of what a person says or does from the larger perspective. And this larger perspective of course is how what is said and done accords with what leads to Christ.

I think this analogy works with how the Church sees not only Nestorius but in fact all those who theologise in the name of the Church whether this ends up with them being denied its seal or receiving it. The Church doesn't just deal with the 'flat plane' of what is said or believed or even intended (although it does take these things into account). The Church rather discerns the implications from the higher perspective of what is said or done. That's why in a way if we don't take this into account or rather agree on the perspective then inevitably we talk past each other with no issue.

This is why I think that while the study of what was actually said is important it has only a restricted place in terms of the Church's message which is more summed up in its labels.

An example of this which has not been raised yet is that up until our own time most all heretical texts were destroyed. This was not simply some 'church curse' on these works or an effort to stifle people but rather an effort to protect the faithful from falling into temptation in regards to what they could encounter in these works. To this very day most Orthodox spiritual fathers would in general counsel against devoting unguarded amounts of time to reading heretical works at least until one had reached a point in ones spiritual life when this no longer posed such a danger. Even then spiritual guidance would be crucial. Why? Precisely because the danger is of taking what one reads at face value as it were. Take the modern arguments that it is an injustice to deny what one could gain from this face value reading and a word of caution is even more in order.

My sense is that the Church's labels refer to how the Church balances what a person says with its actual implications. In this sense the labels are a convenient shorthand for the faithful not only to understand the teachings of the Church but also to protect the faithful from substituting their own readings for that of the Church.

In Christ- Fr Raphael

[Peter Farrington]

Dear Father

I am not sure I agree, I think that you are, to a degree, painting a very rosy picture of what happened and happens in church controversies. It seems to me to be indisputable that Nestorius, who certainly had a defective Christology, was accused of things he did not teach.

It is equally true that Nestorius, Theodoret etc accused St Cyril of things that he did not teach.

What seem quite clearly to have happened was that both sides talked past each other when there could have been the possibility of them talking to each other and coming to an agreement. I don't think it is reasonable to take the confusion, polemics, and even bad-faith of the time, which is evident in many places and many parties, and describe it as if in fact it was wonderfully spiritual and entirely in the will of God.

The Church does need to protect the faithful, but the Church should never use what is not true to protect the faithful.

What Nestorius said is very important in the context of this thread, and I am not quite sure why you discount it? If he did not believe what the label imposed on him says he believed then surely that is untrue, and unjust, and in the end is un-Christian and un-Churchly? I don't find the mystical/spiritual process you describe in the Church history of this period at all, and I think it creates rather a 'monophysite' view of the Church in which the very human, weak and even sinful elements are ignored. I don't think that we have to impute everything in the Church to the Holy Spirit in the sense that if Nestorius was not a Nestorian then it is wrong to call him one. The Holy Spirit does not lie.

It would be like me describing someone here as a Nestorian to some of my own brethren, not because it was strictly true according to the words spoken by such a person, but because it might serve some greater end. I don't see how that is acceptable.

If labels are wrong they should be changed.

As I said in my post, if a Christology is wrong it should be challenged by the Church and can clearly be labelled, but if something has been imputed to someone in error then it is not just or Christian to continue to impute it to them for some other end. Nestorius accepted the Tome of Leo therefore he must have been quite close to Byzantine Christology at least. Even I as an Oriental Orthodox do not believe he taught a two Son Christology. Therefore if it would be a lie for me to say he was a Nestorian then I am not sure how I can be inspired of the Holy Spirit in insisting against the facts that he was a Nestorian?

Best wishes

Peter

[M.C. Steenberg]

Dear all,

I've enjoyed the exchange above. I think that in the recent series of posts by Fr Raphael and Peter, points are being made that I can only assume both of you would agree to, but from differing degrees of emphasis and approach.

To take Peter's most recent point (http://www.monachos.net/forum/showpost.php?p=38800&postcount=6) first, the idea of knowingly adhering to false and misrepresentative labels is quite clear, and I don't think anyone would disagree with it per se. If I call you a dog and find out you're a cat, but continue calling you a dog because I'm more comfortable with it, I'm nobody's fool but my own. I don't see anything in Fr Raphael's recent post (http://www.monachos.net/forum/showpost.php?p=38799&postcount=5) that would argue against this. Labels, titles, or even terminological characterisations that are known to be inaccurate should be addressed, or redressed, as such (see for example the correction at the Sixth Ecumenical Council of too strong a characterisation of 'in (en) rather than from (ek) two natures' mantras, countered with a proclamation, in an ecumenical synod, using ek language).

I do not read Fr Raphael's point to be that inaccurate labels should be maintained; rather, that certain modern / present-day categories of 'fair play', with respect to how one speaks of another's thought, do not necessarily apply to the way that the fathers and the Church have engaged with Christian thought over time. It is a peculiarly modern concept, to think that 'fairness' in representing another means one can only echo precisely what they say, using their own self-exegesis as the only criterion of real interpretation. This is not the way the ancient world tended to work; and by and large, if the Church has absorbed and made her own one way over the other, it has tended to be the ancient, in this regard, rather than the modern.

In the typical exchanges of the ancient world, what was implied in what one said was just as relevant a point of characterisation and criticism as one's actual words, however intended. Cyril's main argument against Nestorius was that his method of approach, his whole conceptual apparatus, if you will, led to a disastrous end. He may not have wanted to teach two Sons, he may have strenuously denied teaching two Sons, he may have -- and did, until his dying breath in exile -- denied any semblance of a divisive or dualistic Christology; but Cyril's criticism was that, intention aside, these were the effects of his approach. And indeed, this is a rather fair and true assessment.

The Church has tended to call 'Nestorianism' that system which was (and remains) the logical 'outgrowth' of Nestorius' reasoning and articulation of Christ: an interpretation of natures, prosopa and union that leads, ultimately, to a divisive Christology. Nestorius may have denied the end results of this characterisation (thus I think it is entirely fair to say that Nestorius 'was not a Nestorian' in this immediate, practical sense); but it remains nonetheless a valid and credible criticism of his method of articulation.

The same is broadly the case with Arius, though the details here are harder to pin down. The Church came to call 'Arianism' that system of thought that grew out of Arius' basic convictions that the Father, as transcendent and immutable God, cannot generate a being of co-equal divinity (since an unbegotten begetting is not possible). The 'end-results' of Arianism as most often understood -- that the Son is not divine, and is 'simply a creature' -- are things Arius would have denied (and in fact did so strenuously); nonetheless, such 'ends' (teloi) are reasonable and direct consequences of his method of approach.

Through its history, the Church has found it necessary to tease out the implications of what individuals say, rather than simply stick to their direct comments and quotations (which is what would resonate more readily with us who are used to modern media and academic norms of 'fairness'). But the attitude of the Church, and indeed of most of the fathers towards one another, has been that a desire to be 'fair' to an individual is entirely subordinate to the desire to maintain truth and prevent its perversion. So even if I may never say directly that Christ is two, if I describe a system of thought which, when teased out, leads to that end, calling such thought 'Matthewism' is not necessarily an unfair label (God forbid).

So there's something quite different, to abuse my own analogies even further, between calling you a dog when you're clearly a cat (which is simply silly), and the kind of characterisation certain historical/theological labels imply -- not least because 'you are a dog' or 'you are a cat' are simple point-of-fact commentaries; whereas trinitarian or Christological articulations are whole modes of approach and understanding, as much as they are conclusions. And modes are more flexible, and can yield unseen ends.

INXC, Matthew

[John Charmley]

trinitarian or Christological articulations are whole modes of approach and understanding, as much as they are conclusions. And modes are more flexible, and can yield unseen ends.


Dear all,

Indeed, and Matthew makes many important points, but flexibility can actually be a double-edged sword; much of what the Church has come to lebel heresy can be seen as the consequence of taking flexibility to conclusions which later come to seem unacceptable; Origen would be a case in point here.

When Matthew writes that it


is a peculiarly modern concept, to think that 'fairness' in representing another means one can only echo precisely what they say, using their own self-exegesis as the only criterion of real interpretation

the question arose in my mind as to whether this was not something of a straw man? Has anyone really argued that 'fairness' excludes critical examination of what another says, and the criticism that goes along with that? 'Fairness' consists in accurately representing what one's interlocutor has said; otherwise one's own side of the debate becomes a form of solipsism is which one is really debating with one's self. The burning of straw men, whilst infinitely preferable to burning each other, does tend to generate more heat than light.

Whether ancient or modern, it has always been a sensible way of carrying on discourse to establish the explicit parameters of one's interlocutor's thought before, in all charity, pointing out that the implications of it are heretical, and that a child of five could have seen that! Nestorius may have argued 'strictly speaking', but St. Cyril's critique of his thought is so devastating precisely because it points out where 'flexibility' will lead that mode of thought. The reason why Theodore's critique of St. Cyril's Christology fails to impress is that it clearly misunderstands it on its way to misrepresenting it

When Matthew writes that:


The Church has tended to call 'Nestorianism' that system which was (and remains) the logical 'outgrowth' of Nestorius' reasoning and articulation of Christ: an interpretation of natures, prosopa and union that leads, ultimately, to a divisive Christology. Nestorius may have denied the end results of this characterisation (thus I think it is entirely fair to say that Nestorius 'was not a Nestorian' in this immediate, practical sense); but it remains nonetheless a valid and credible criticism of his method of articulation.

he provides us with a valuable tool for understanding how the labels work, as well as what they might mean. The challenge lies in the word 'logical'. My reading of what the Assyrian Church now teaches is that it would accept that a 'logical' way of reading what Nestorius wrote lies down the road of 'Nestorianism', but that its own reading is a different 'logical' one which does not lead down that road; that does not mean we have to accept that because of some 'modern' definition of fairness; it simply means we must understand their terms of debate before we can engage seriously (if we wish) with the Assyrian understanding of Christology.

If there is anything in this line of approach, we can perhaps nuance the apparent dichotomy posed in the statement that:


But the attitude of the Church, and indeed of most of the fathers towards one another, has been that a desire to be 'fair' to an individual is entirely subordinate to the desire to maintain truth and prevent its perversion.
Otherwise, 'logically' one risks getting into exactly the territory our enemies accuse us of occupying, namely that 'truth' and 'fairness' are incompatible, and that Christians will use any means, however unfair, to protect their Faith from harm; it is the sort of thing which the Da Vinci Code book takes to bonkers extremes. Perhaps the implication of what I am saying is that if there seems to be a conflict between 'fairness' and the 'Truth' then we are not understanding something?

But perhaps I am misreading what Matthew writes?

In Christ,

John

[Matthew Panchisin]

Dear Steenberg,

As a matter of precaution in case your words are ever taken out of context, would you mind editing your above post from Matthewism to Steenbergism?

In Christ,

Matthew Panchisin

[M.C. Steenberg]

As a matter of precaution in case your words are ever taken out of context, would you mind editing your above post from Matthewism to Steenbergism?

Ah, dear Matthew, you've happened upon my clever ruse to ensure that, should I ever be accused of said heresy, I shall simply claim it was you and not I who did all the wrong. :)

INXC, Matthew

[M.C. Steenberg]

Dear John,

Thank you for the further thoughts. I don't think I was creating a straw man with my comments above, as I wasn't indicating any specific context -- just that the modern trend in dialogue. McGuckin has some excellent comments on this theme in his book on Cyril.

Simply a reminder that the terms of 'fair play' are not consistent over time. I'm not certain the fathers had a notion of 'fair' in this modern sense; which isn't to say we should not ourselves have it, but to recognise that what we consider a normal context today has not always been so. (Any good references to patristic uses of the concept of fair representation most welcome.)


Whether ancient or modern, it has always been a sensible way of carrying on discourse to establish the explicit parameters of one's interlocutor's thought before, in all charity, pointing out that the implications of it are heretical, and that a child of five could have seen that!


Indeed. I don't believe anyone would wish to claim otherwise! But one has to bear in mind that ecclesial conversation about theological themes are not necessarily focussed on the same ends as academic discussions, so how such engagement with the thought of another will be internalised into the Church's consciousness will not always follow the same patterns of representation. It might be quite wrong to speak of 'Nestorianism' as an academically-upholdable category arising out of Nestorius' life, writings and influence; but there are ecclesial realms in which 'Nestorianism' is a useful means of engagement with one type of thought.

INXC, Matthew

[Peter Farrington]

Hi Matthew

This is an interesting idea, and I must agree with it to an extent. Indeed it is clear that the rejection of Chalcedon and the Tome was based to some degree on just such a process of extrapolating ideas to conclusions that might not have been accepted by those who put forward the ideas, and they might even have been rejected, but they were seen as being the tendency of such ideas.

I understand and accept that.

But I think I have a problem with the way in which this was conducted, on all sides, my own, the Byzantine and the Church of the East. Since it seems to me that the consideration of views was not conducted in any sort of quiet, spiritual, reflective and eirenic environment at all, and this seems to be being passed over. Likewise the involvement of secular authority.

When St Cyril writes his second letter to Nestorius he extrapolates as we have described and says,


If, however, we reject the hypostatic union as being either impossible or too unlovely for the Word, we fall into the fallacy of speaking of two sons.

I have no problem with what St Cyril is positively teaching, in that I understand what he means and also confess the hypostatic union, which is much more than a personal union, and in this place hypostasis is not a synonym for prosopon. But I wonder if he is aware of how Nestorius will take the passage? Is he aware of how Nestorius understands hypostatic union?

Indeed though the second letter is very important for describing St Cyril's point of view, and I wholly and entirely agree with it, it does not seem to really engage with Nestorius' thought except in a rather stereotypical way. He does not ask 'what do you mean?', and he does not seem to try to explain himself using Nestorius' lexicon. Therefore I am not convinced that the outcome of the Nestorian controversy was of necessity what happened. There was a need to extrapolate, and the dangers of Nestorius', really Theodore's, Christology were clear, but was there really any effort to understand, explain and clarify?

I am not sure.

As is often the case in discussions, it seems to me that Nestorius is most often concerned with the 'what' of the incarnation, while St Cyril is most often concerned with the 'who' and even the 'why'. This is not to say that Theodore's Christology is not weak, I believe it is, but it seems to me that it is possible to go some way down the Theodorean track without ceasing to be Orthodox. Certainly it is possible to use Theodorean language of duality without necessarily dividing Christ, and even Severus was willing to speak of two natures if the hypostatic union was confessed.

I guess, finally, that I am saying that though the Church does extrapolate and say 'this position is dangerous because it tends towards this heresy', this is not good enough when it comes to real people and real lives. It does not seem Christian, if we should drop the concept of fairness, to judge a person and curse them even, for a position which they do not hold and would repudiate.

I have had doubts about the language used by some of the people I have corresponded with over the years, it certainly has seemed to tend towards an unacceptable position, but I have never felt comfortable judging them for a position they do not hold but which their language might tend to.

The Church can clearly say that all manner of positions are genuinely unacceptable, but it does seem wrong, always, to attribute to a person a position which they do not hold, and especially without any real effort to dialogue with them about those positions.

I hope I am not being thought a Nestorian!

Peter

[Matthew Panchisin]

Dear Peter,

There have been some real efforts for real dialogue with the Church of the East. In my local area it's been going on for about 30 years. The Patriarchate of the Assyrian Church of the East is in Morton Grove Illinois. The Nestorian clergy often speak with the Eastern Orthodox clergy and others.

If you would like I certainly can re-introduce Quasha Klutz to this forum for a discussion on the matter if that trapist or tropist Steenberg does not object to real diaolgue.

In Christ,

Panchisin

[Peter Farrington]

Dear Matthew P

Though I am personally interested in dialogue with the Church of the East, and dialogue between the OO and CotE has also been going on for decades, nevertheless, bearing in mind the moderatorial desire that this list not be used for such dialogue needs to be borne in mind.

Best wishes

Peter

[Tim Grass]

This idea that modern ideas of fairness shouldn't be read into patristic writings seems, to me at least, absolutely critical...... obviously we want to be accurate in our studies. But it's a kind of modern arrogance to think our own standards of fairness and accuracy are neccesarily better than others.

It's the great throne of the armchair academic.... discovering that he knows better than all that's gone before.

--tim

[Peter Farrington]

Hi Tim

I am not sure why it is arrogant to believe that there is a universal notion of fairness which requires that all people involved in a dispute are heard properly.

If Nestorius, for instance, did not ever confess a two Son Christology and repudiated it, as he did, then it is not only unfair, but a lie, to insist that he did. And it is never of the Holy Spirit to perpetuate a lie.

We can certainly point out where his Christology was flawed, and where it tended to certain ends, but to describe as arrogance the Christian requirement that we be based on truth in all we say and do seems very problematic to me.

Peter

[John Charmley]

Good imagery of straw and fire. I just don't see how they apply here. How is talking about an idea of fairness a "straw man?" I must admit: I didn't follow the logic of your post at all. Did you read the post that you were responding to? It seemed totally reasonable to me.

Michael

Dear Michael,

I am sorry if you gained the impression that my post was unfair and did not speak to what Matthew had written; clarity, is always in the eye of the reader, and I must clearly strive to recall that.

I was specifically referring to the lines

It is a peculiarly modern concept, to think that 'fairness' in representing another means one can only echo precisely what they say, using their own self-exegesis as the only criterion of real interpretation.
and commenting that it seemed as though so precise an articulation might be unhelpful in that it seemed to me unlikely that anyone had actually argued that the only means to conducting dialogue was to 'echo precisely' what others say 'using their own self-exegesis as the only criterion'.

So, to answer your question, yes, I had read it, and, as my closing comment suggested, I was aware that I might have misread it. As you can see, I hope, it was not 'fairness' that was the potential straw man, but the dichotomy implied in the definition.

A lesson, I suppose, in what it means to 'read'? Matthew's response suggested that he was not unhappy with what was said, but of course, we must all form our opinion. For my part, if what I wrote seemed unfair, I do apologise, as ever here, my intention is to promote dialogue, not polemic, and if I have strayed too far in the latter direction, I am sorry for it.

I am interested in what Tim posts, and would like to know more. Clearly this concept of 'fairness' is touching a rawish nerve, and it would be good to explore this a little further.

What, for example, are we to understand by 'modern standards of fairness'? I can see a direction from which I would fully sympathise with Tim's strictures about modern arrogance - it is that that is driving me from the Anglican communion towards Orthodoxy - but it would be good to know more here.

Again, accept my apologies if offence was caused, it was not intentional - which is not to excuse it.

In Christ,

John

[Fr Raphael Vereshack]

John Charmley wrote:


and commenting that it seemed as though so precise an articulation might be unhelpful in that it seemed to me unlikely that anyone had actually argued that the only means to conducting dialogue was to 'echo precisely' what others say 'using their own self-exegesis as the only criterion'.

Still though what we were talking about was whether the labels of the Church; eg Nestorian is a Nestorian is justified.

What is being said is that that such labeling is found in the earliest Fathers and then conciliar documents of the Church. Later on we find it in the Church's hymnography. To add to what was said before probably such a way of thinking is also found in the Epistles.

Of course this in itself doesn't show Church labelling to be correct. But when we study what this way of communicating by the Church means we discover that it refers to the ability of the Church to see the implications of what any of us do or say. This is part of the Church's main activity for the Church guided by the Holy Spirit is able to see the reality of what is done by people & thereby refer to it with a kind of short hand.

Thus for example Nestorius objected that he held to the kind of thought he was accused of. He wrote and said this for all to hear. But in the eyes of the Church he deserves the title of Nestorian in the sense that his thought and manner of expressing himself does tend in this direction. So the Church labels this tendency Nestorianism and includes Nestorius himself in this category.

Something similar actually applies to all of us. Sin isn't just a right or wrong action. It's more an action that within a larger context leads to something which is inimical to the life which Christ offers us. Often it is this context which is not recognized by us with the result that we justify ourselves with our own reference points. And that's precisely the problem- the two reference points between the Church & us do not match up. Inevitably the reason for this disparity is selfishness on our part. The Church frequently in its advice to us then uses a kind of short-hand language to warn us of the dangers, consequences and way out of this (the language implies all of this together).

Of course we are free to respond to this that the Church is or is not being fair in its assessment of our sin. We are also free to allow that at every step we do not see the consequences of our own actions clearly- that there is a higher authority than our own assessment of ourselves. Or we can resist this. Every step in which we dig in our heels a little more gets more and more sharp critique from the Church with a consequent sharpening and tightening up of its language. And typically as this occurs the person being warned reacts with greater and greater defensiveness that the Church is unfair and using unjustified labels.

I think that it is this which describes the main problem with Nestorius and also by what the Church means by Nestorianism. The latter isn't just a problematic or point of view; rather it's recalcitrant & selfish, it's myopic & also idiosyncratic in a way which refuses to listen to the rest of the Church. All of this together with the way in which this was played out over time provides the context for what the Church meant by how it conveyed itself about this.

Modern standards of fairness at least as I read them appeals to what are really self-created and selfish standards as the ultimate criterion for what one does; it's me appealing against the idea that there could be something greater than I.

But there's also in this idea of fairness something which takes my actions out of the larger context in which the Church sees them & keeps referring this back to myself.

Here again context is crucial for understanding what the Church is saying. And this also helps explain why the Church uses the labels it does.

In Christ- Fr Raphael

[Peter Farrington]

I am sorry Father, I am trying hard to follow the argument in this thread but it seems rather ad hominem to describe anyone who disagrees with calling Nestorius a Nestorian as either 'selfish', or 'arrogant'.

It seems to me, and I may well be selfish and arrogant of course, that if Nestorius did not believe the things that are included in Nestorianism then he was not a Nestorian.

I do struggle to see why some find it impossible to criticise our Fathers as though any criticism is destructive of some carefully constructed edifice. The Fathers are more important than our criticism and big enough to handle it.

If Nestorius is a dog, to use Matthew's analogy, then it is always untrue to call him a cat. We may call him a mammal. We may describe the similarity of his body to that of a cat. But if he is a dog then we are not telling the truth if we say he is a cat.

I am struggling to understand the subtext that insists on saying something which is untrue. I am not sure why this is necessary? Maybe I am an 'armchair academic' as well, but that also seems only a comment designed to preclude discussion and study.

I think that study of Nestorius' own writings, and I have the Bazaar here in front of me, show him to be tendentious, pedantic, narrow minded theologically, and rather too confident in his own position and understanding. But I do not see anywhere that I could say he taught two Sons. Indeed he claims the Tome as his own Christology. If he supports the Tome then surely it is problematic to insist that he must be a Nestorian because he is called a Nestorian.

I think that the main problem for me is the description of the Church in terms which separate it from the members of the Church. We cannot properly speak of 'the Church' deciding that Nestorius believed such and such, without actually getting down to the nitty-gritty of who we mean and where and how determined that Nestorius was a Nestorian. And when we get down there then we discover misunderstanding and animosity and lack of good will on many parts and we do not find the truth appearing, pristine and without confusion, we find a great deal of trouble and strife and eventually it is clear what Nestorianism is but it seems to me that it is never really considered whether Nestorius was a Nestorian.

If the Church is filled with the Holy Spirit then untruths have no place in her life. It seems to me to be untrue to say that Nestorius believed in two Sons, whatever the weakness of his Christology, therefore to perpetuate such an imputation is not of the Holy Spirit. Let us describe him by his own Christology not by someone else's.

Best wishes

Peter

[John Charmley]

My sense is that the Church's labels refer to how the Church balances what a person says with its actual implications. In this sense the labels are a convenient shorthand for the faithful not only to understand the teachings of the Church but also to protect the faithful from substituting their own readings for that of the Church.

In Christ- Fr Raphael

Dear Fr. Raphael,

Most helpful. This was what I was groping towards in my intial post when I asked about the utility of labels.

Again, when you write:

Modern standards of fairness at least as I read them appeals to what are really self-created and selfish standards as the ultimate criterion for what one does; it's me appealing against the idea that there could be something greater than I.

But there's also in this idea of fairness something which takes my actions out of the larger context in which the Church sees them & keeps referring this back to myself.

that is a most helpful clarification. What I was feeling my way towards was the notion that there is something called 'real' fairness, which is to be in tune with God's will, which the Church guides us towards; it was from that point of view that I was suggesting there should be no dichotomy between fairness and the Truth.

As a very old-fashioned Anglican I was taught that the foundation of ideas such as 'fairness' was the Ten Commandments, and it was from that direction, not the modern liberal version, I was coming.

But I should most interested to learn more about what 'fairness' means to others here.

INXC


John

[Tim Grass]

Peter, I think that you don't really understand the concepts that are being discussed here, since in response to them you keep echoing the same reactions that don't actually engage with what people are trying to discuss.... you seem instead to have a pretty set notion of how things work, and aren't willing to enter into other possible readings. Your responses tend to just repeat points that are themselves straw-man arguments, since no one has made the claims you respond to negatively. For example:



I am not sure why it is arrogant to believe that there is a universal notion of fairness which requires that all people involved in a dispute are heard properly.


No one in this thread has actually said anything of the sort. I don't think any of the posts in this thread have argued that we shouldn't read the Fathers for what they actually said....... hear them properly, as you say. What's being suggestes is that just what someone said isn't the full scope of how the Fathers heard each other...... or how we should approach them.

Again:


If Nestorius, for instance, did not ever confess a two Son Christology and repudiated it, as he did, then it is not only unfair, but a lie, to insist that he did. And it is never of the Holy Spirit to perpetuate a lie.

But no one's said that we should say he did. In fact, it's been made pretty clear that he didn't, and that we should understand that he didn't...... this is where I don't think you understand the deeper issues people like Matthew and Fr. Raphael have been trying to raise, since your responses are always to react in the very kind of way that they're saying isn't authentic to the Fathers.

The point people are trying to raise is that just what an individual said alone isn't sufficient to the actual course of Patristic dialogue. It's a simplified and simplistic way to read history.... based essentially in your own sense of how history should be read.

Again:


We can certainly point out where his Christology was flawed, and where it tended to certain ends, but to describe as arrogance the Christian requirement that we be based on truth in all we say and do seems very problematic to me.

Of course, no one here has said that it is arrogant to be based on the truth..... but people have suggested that the way the Fathers and the Church understand the truth of situations may not be the same we approach it, who are used to how representing other people's thought works in our academic journals, the media and whatnot.

The question isn't whether one should be truthful in reading the Fathers (obviously).... but whether discovering truth is more of a discursive project than you seem to give it credit for..... something that's deeper than just hearing someone's words.

But you don't seem to hear this. Again:



It seems to me, and I may well be selfish and arrogant of course, that if Nestorius did not believe the things that are included in Nestorianism then he was not a Nestorian.


Here again, I wonder if you've actually read what people in this thread are trying to get at.... you're just repeating the same point, which doesn't actually engage the issue. The issue is that it isn't just what someone says that the Fathers used to judge thought. It seems to me that this simplistic reading is exactly what people are saying is insufficient to a truly Patristic approach. From Matthew's post:



In the typical exchanges of the ancient world, what was implied in what one said was just as relevant a point of characterisation and criticism as one's actual words, however intended. Cyril's main argument against Nestorius was that his method of approach, his whole conceptual apparatus, if you will, led to a disastrous end. He may not have wanted to teach two Sons, he may have strenuously denied teaching two Sons, he may have -- and did, until his dying breath in exile -- denied any semblance of a divisive or dualistic Christology; but Cyril's criticism was that, intention aside, these were the effects of his approach. And indeed, this is a rather fair and true assessment.

The Church has tended to call 'Nestorianism' that system which was (and remains) the logical 'outgrowth' of Nestorius' reasoning and articulation of Christ: an interpretation of natures, prosopa and union that leads, ultimately, to a divisive Christology. Nestorius may have denied the end results of this characterisation (thus I think it is entirely fair to say that Nestorius 'was not a Nestorian' in this immediate, practical sense); but it remains nonetheless a valid and credible criticism of his method of articulation.

Now that's pretty clear to me..... and the whole point of it is that just claiming Nestorius didn't say "Nestorian" things, so he wasn't a Nestorian.... or to use your words: "if Nestorius did not believe the things that are included in Nestorianism then he was not a Nestorian.".... isn't sufficient to understand how patristic history works. It fails to actually read the "other" the way the Fathers read the other.... it takes your academic stance that "what Nestorius said is what Nestorius meant" as wrote. But to engage in real patristic study has to involve an awareness that this isn't the way the Fathers themselves engaged with one another.

Later you said:


I do struggle to see why some find it impossible to criticise our Fathers as though any criticism is destructive of some carefully constructed edifice. The Fathers are more important than our criticism and big enough to handle it.

You've made similar points in other threads..... and I found them just as unconvincing there. Not one person in this thread is saying that the Fathers should be held up to some constructed edifice, or that they shouldn't be criticized. If anything, it seems to me that the kind of issues being raised in this thread are far more critically aware of genuine patristic thought and history than the fairly simplistic reading you keep giving in reaction..... because they're raised in engagement with not only what the Fathers say, but also how they thought and interacted.

You don't seem to like the reading offered, so you call it "uncritical." This is just a shame....... part of being a critical student of a subject is being willing to discover things about it that go against your intuition, without feeling that the people bring them to your attention are part of some attempt to silence real study.... or are just toeing some party line. Part of what people seem to be trying to say is that the comments you're making need to take fuller account of actual history and Patristic ways of interacting.

Again:


If Nestorius is a dog, to use Matthew's analogy, then it is always untrue to call him a cat. We may call him a mammal. We may describe the similarity of his body to that of a cat. But if he is a dog then we are not telling the truth if we say he is a cat.

You clearly have read Matthew's post, but just as clearly haven't engaged with his point. No one wants to call a cat a dog, and no one suggest that would be wise or good. But he used that analogy, I think pretty clearly, in order to show that this kind of identification isn't what we're talking about. To quote him exactly:



So there's something quite different, to abuse my own analogies even further, between calling you a dog when you're clearly a cat (which is simply silly), and the kind of characterisation certain historical/theological labels imply -- not least because 'you are a dog' or 'you are a cat' are simple point-of-fact commentaries; whereas trinitarian or Christological articulations are whole modes of approach and understanding, as much as they are conclusions. And modes are more flexible, and can yield unseen ends.


Now, if you can read that, and then post a reply about Nestorius saying "But if he is a dog then we are not telling the truth if we say he is a cat"..... then it seems to me you're either not willing to engage with the point being raised (since it's about the fact that saying such a thing fails to see the point), or you don't understand it.

Again:


I am struggling to understand the subtext that insists on saying something which is untrue. I am not sure why this is necessary?

No one is saying this..... but in repeatedly failing to allow that what is true might go beyond what one specifically says, or that identifying themes in someone's thought that go beyond what they say is "untrue"..... well, you've pretty well made Matthew and Fr. Raphael's points for them.

Later you said:


Maybe I am an 'armchair academic' as well, but that also seems only a comment designed to preclude discussion and study.

Not really, Peter. It is a comment designed to spur on real study..... i.e. engaging with the way Patristic history actually took place and the way the Fathers actually interacted..... rather than a kind of study that begins with your own definitions of fair play, truth, and so on. It's not uncritical just because it challenges your framework, Peter!

--tim

[John Charmley]

Thanks for your reponse John. Maybe there's a little misreading all around. I can't imagine that Matthew Steenburg's point was actually that these are the only things people would use or do... reacting to it like that seems a little bit like not seeing the forest for the trees, or at least not going for a basic point by trying to set up your own false dichotomies in it. Seemed pretty obvious (to me at least) that he was saying "Today, to be fair to another person means generally that you talk aboutwhat they said, but in the past people were more comfortable talking about what people didn't say, but where their thought could lead, and were happy to call this fair." I can't see how that's anything other than sensible.

Michael

Dear Michael,

Alas, what was 'pretty clear' to you, was less so to me; but that is in the nature of misreading, and in fairness (on either model) I did suggest at the end of my post an awareness of a possible misreading.

I remain interested in when the concept of 'fairness' changed as is being suggested. Not bearing false witness is hardly a modern liberal concept, and much modern criticism seems quite at home discussing what people did not say - that, after all, is one of the bases of post-modernism. Perhaps a few examples will get this one through my fog of misunderstanding?



INXC

John

[Peter Farrington]

Dear Tim

I can only surmise that you have misunderstood my own posts, as I appear to be misunderstanding others. It certainly seemed to me that posters were suggesting that it did not really matter what Nestorius believed since it had been determined by 'the Church' that he was a Nestorian.

I am not an academic, so your description of me having a particularly academic method is rather missing the mark. I wish I were more academic, indeed in middle age I am only finally coming to Syriac studies.

If you look through the thread you will in fact find that posters have used the words 'selfish', 'arrogant', and 'armchair academic'. These do all seem rather personal terms and unsuited to patristic studies, and I certainly do not wish to raise the temperature, so perhaps I will say no more on this particular point and merely note the opinions of those posters who seem to disagree with me.

Personally I will stick with the words of MC Steenberg who says,


I think it is entirely fair to say that Nestorius 'was not a Nestorian' in this immediate, practical sense.

this seems to contradict your opinion of my post where you say,


.. to use your words: "if Nestorius did not believe the things that are included in Nestorianism then he was not a Nestorian.".... isn't sufficient to understand how patristic history works..

I appreciate the insight into your view of the workings of patristic history, but I do not agree with it.

Peter

[Fr Raphael Vereshack]

Dear Peter,

I only just got back online right now so had no time to read your post until now.

Please be assured that my post above was only meant as a general comment about how the Church at times uses certain labels. There's really no other intent in it.

In Christ- Fr Raphael

[Peter Farrington]

Dear Father,

having read it several times further this past hour or so I believe I can see that, and I am sure we agree that there is a need for labels and a usefulness in labels, and I believe we also agree that such labels can and should go beyond what a person might have said and meant.

My only intent was to witness to the need to also hear what people do say and do mean, not only in the patristic period but also, as we have discussed, in relation to the present Church of the East, and indeed Evangelicals, Catholics etc etc. so that labels are not applied without care.

Best wishes

Peter

[Fr Raphael Vereshack]

Dear Fr. Raphael,

Most helpful. This was what I was groping towards in my intial post when I asked about the utility of labels.

Again, when you write:

that is a most helpful clarification. What I was feeling my way towards was the notion that there is something called 'real' fairness, which is to be in tune with God's will, which the Church guides us towards; it was from that point of view that I was suggesting there should be no dichotomy between fairness and the Truth.

As a very old-fashioned Anglican I was taught that the foundation of ideas such as 'fairness' was the Ten Commandments, and it was from that direction, not the modern liberal version, I was coming.

But I should most interested to learn more about what 'fairness' means to others here.

INXC


John

All of my posts have had mainly in mind that we're talking about Theology & Labels. Matthew S raised the question of fairness as this is often brought up in relation to the modern hesitancy about using Church labels. I continued with this thought as part of my previous effort to explain how I feel labelling is just part of the Church's use of a kind of short hand to convey its truth. In the context we were talking about- Nestorianism- this is a truth which was clearly resisted by Nestorius for being 'unfair'. To him the Church clearly was unfair in its accusation of him. (There are quotes from his writings clearly to this effect).

So my point is only that this is very similar to the impasse we ourselves often get into in regards to the Church's referring to our own sins. When the Church accuses our sin we often see this as unfair. Further we often feel the Church uses unfair labelling about our sin because it does not, we feel, take enough account of our intent (again Nestorius clearly referred to how his Christology in no way has the intent attributed to it by the Church).

Again what we see here I think is directly related to how at times we become recalcitrant in our particular vision in effect putting our own wisdom above that of the Church. Thus Nestorius couldn't hear what the Church was saying about his theological views & felt it to be unfair. And this was due to his own arrogance because of his arrogance probably more than mistaken views.

My main point here then is that although it is interesting to read Nestorius if done with caution (I outlined the reasons why the Church urges extreme caution in this reading- precisely because of the possibility to be affected by what we read and not see the problem) the labels used in his regard do point to something extremely important and are not unfair.

At least that's how I see the issues of theology, labels and fairness :)

In Christ- Fr Raphael

[Tim Grass]

It certainly seemed to me that posters were suggesting that it did not really matter what Nestorius believed since it had been determined by 'the Church' that he was a Nestorian.

I've just gone through the thread again..... and I really can't see any comment where this is said. There are several comments that say it's not improper to read Nestorius in light of the implications of his thought, not just his own words.... comments that say just because he verbally denied a dualistic Christology doesn't mean his thought doesn't still produce one. But nothing that says his beliefs don't matter or aren't relevant to understaning and reading him. (I'm guessing you're talking mostly about Fr. Raphael's posts #5 (http://www.monachos.net/forum/showpost.php?p=38799&postcount=5) and #19 (http://www.monachos.net/forum/showpost.php?p=38840&postcount=19) in this thread.... but he doesn't say this. He says... in my paraphrase here.... that Nestorius' disagreement with certain parts of what is called "Nestorianism" doesn't necessarily mean the title isn't applicable to him, since the label deals with the effects of his thought that he couldn't see or wouldn't admit. Saying you don't have a dualistic Christology doens't mean you don't).


If you look through the thread you will in fact find that posters have used the words 'selfish', 'arrogant', and 'armchair academic'. These do all seem rather personal terms and unsuited to patristic studies

I think now you're being pretty unfair, Peter. Yes, these words were used...... and if they were just used to sling at people, that would be counter-productive (and just plain rude). But that's not how any of them were used.... and the way they were used isn't only suitable to patristic studies: they show patristic study as something more than just casual history-book reading.

To take each one in turn:

'selfish' and 'arrogant': These were used in Fr. Raphael's post (#19 (http://www.monachos.net/forum/showpost.php?p=38840&postcount=19) in the thread). Your reaction to them came in your reply to his post (#20 (http://www.monachos.net/forum/showpost.php?p=38842&postcount=20)).... where you said:


I am sorry Father, I am trying hard to follow the argument in this thread but it seems rather ad hominem to describe anyone who disagrees with calling Nestorius a Nestorian as either 'selfish', or 'arrogant'.


i.e. you characterised Fr. Raphael as just ad hominem comments "designed to preclude discussion and study."

What Fr. Raphael actually wrote was:


I think that it is this which describes the main problem with Nestorius and also by what the Church means by Nestorianism. The latter isn't just a problematic or point of view; rather it's recalcitrant & selfish, it's myopic & also idiosyncratic in a way which refuses to listen to the rest of the Church. All of this together with the way in which this was played out over time provides the context for what the Church meant by how it conveyed itself about this.

What's said very directly there is that there's an identifyably myopic characteristic to Nestorius' own approach.... he refuses to see or accept that what he's saying might have meanings past what he says. He refuses to accept the criticisms of his own way of thinking, ending up just repeating "I don't teach two Sons" without really taking on board what other people were saying in his own day: that you don't have to say it to say it, and the approach is dangerous, even if you deny the ends. This is what Fr. Raphael was calling "selfish" (also recalcitrant, myopic and idiosyncratic). Cyril, by the way, seemed to understand this..... people identified plenty that was dangerous in his way of speaking too.... and he was, despite being a pretty hot-headed fellow himself, selfless enough to accept correction or other ways of expressing what he was saying that were less open to difficulties.

Fr. Raphael used the word "selfish" one other time, in the next paragraph of his post:


Modern standards of fairness at least as I read them appeals to what are really self-created and selfish standards as the ultimate criterion for what one does; it's me appealing against the idea that there could be something greater than I.

This pretty clearly isn't what you called it: "ad hominem to describe anyone who disagrees with calling Nestorius a Nestorian as either 'selfish', or 'arrogant'"...... it's a statement showing that the same problem Nestorius demonstrates is still around today.

Patristic history isn't just a history book... there are ethical, methodological, moral aspects to to what goes on.

Next: 'armchair academic': These were my own words, from post #16 (http://www.monachos.net/forum/showpost.php?p=38837&postcount=16), where I said:


But it's a kind of modern arrogance to think our own standards of fairness and accuracy are neccesarily better than others.

It's the great throne of the armchair academic.... discovering that he knows better than all that's gone before.

Perhaps I was a bit bald in my words.... that's nothing new, I'm afraid. But they certainly weren't meant the way you took them.... which was the way you have taken many comments that seem to challenge your reading. You said:


Maybe I am an 'armchair academic' as well, but that also seems only a comment designed to preclude discussion and study.

No.... it was a comment designed to say that genuine study can't just be about applying your own standards of what's fair and just to situations that had very different ideas about these things. "It's a kind of modern arrogance to think our own standards of fairness and accuracy are neccesarily better than others"......... to say that, "Since I've determined he didn't say something, I'm going to apply my standard of proper reading to say that the long history of commentary on him is wrong, since it doesn't acknowledge my awareness of his situation." To me this is "armchair academics" because it refused to really engage with the full dynamic of Patristic thought and history.

Finally.... I should just point out a pretty dramatic instance of selective quoting of this thread: In your response to me, you having said:


It certainly seemed to me that posters were suggesting that it did not really matter what Nestorius believed since it had been determined by 'the Church' that he was a Nestorian.

....you seemed to set Matthew Steenberg up against this by saying:



Personally I will stick with the words of MC Steenberg who says,

Quotation:
I think it is entirely fair to say that Nestorius 'was not a Nestorian' in this immediate, practical sense.


Here's what he actually wrote in context (post #7 (http://www.monachos.net/forum/showpost.php?p=38802&postcount=7)). I'll put the bit you quoted in italics, and bits that show what he meant in bold:


The Church has tended to call 'Nestorianism' that system which was (and remains) the logical 'outgrowth' of Nestorius' reasoning and articulation of Christ: an interpretation of natures, prosopa and union that leads, ultimately, to a divisive Christology. Nestorius may have denied the end results of this characterisation (thus I think it is entirely fair to say that Nestorius 'was not a Nestorian' in this immediate, practical sense); but it remains nonetheless a valid and credible criticism of his method of articulation.

In the previous paragraph he wrote:


Cyril's main argument against Nestorius was that his method of approach, his whole conceptual apparatus, if you will, led to a disastrous end. He may not have wanted to teach two Sons, he may have strenuously denied teaching two Sons, he may have -- and did, until his dying breath in exile -- denied any semblance of a divisive or dualistic Christology; but Cyril's criticism was that, intention aside, these were the effects of his approach. And indeed, this is a rather fair and true assessment.

--tim

[Peter Farrington]

Dear Tim

I have no wish to argue with you, and little enough time, so I will just pass over your post since it is not my desire to cause you any difficult feelings.

I am not quite sure why so much print is being expended on the rather inconsequential and peripheral content of my posts, especially since I have already said to Father Raphael that I pretty much agree with him.

I wish you well

Peter

[M.C. Steenberg]

Dear all,

There have been some interesting points made in this thread. I wanted to take up the idea that the Church reads the fathers, which was brought out earlier by Fr Raphael and since commented on by various others. It seems to me that this is one of the integral parts of the patristic consciousness of Christianity and the Orthodox Church; something from which it gains a great deal but from which it also has a number of serious challenges posed.

I think Fr Raphael is quite right that certain usage of 'labels' and categories are taken up as pastoral, ascetical guideposts for right living and right thought, drawn out of specific disputes, controversies, persons, etc. in a manner that tries to find a far deeper message and point, and which may or may not linger on much direct bearing with the source. Athanasius' usage of Nicaea's creed is a good example here, as are the deliberations of the seventh council vis-a-vis icons, etc. And I do agree also with the general point, re-stated here in my own words, that there is a kind of ascetical-pastoral focus to this mode of taking up and engaging with patristic testimony.

But the great challenge posed comes in the question of the how, and also the 'who' behind the how -- namely, how the Church sorts through the patristic heritage in this manner, and who within the Church does so. There is no single answer to either question; this is simply part of the way patristic Christianity has always worked, much more a collective assembly of pastoral reading and application than a systematic attempt at a standardised reading. But there are various loci of reading and application: the councils, and perhaps even more notably the liturgical texts and commemorations established in the synods and patriarchates.

This ascetical-pastoral mode of reading the fathers is not the only way that Orthodoxy reads -- that's also worth noting. It is one way, and one with immense practical value. But it can easily be abused, which is I think something of which the Church is well aware. One of the chief forms of abuse is to see it as the only form of reading, which allows too strong a disfiguration of various messages in the patristic testimony (some of this has happened with Nestorianism; far more, to my mind, with Origen).

INXC, Matthew

[John Charmley]

This ascetical-pastoral mode of reading the fathers is not the only way that Orthodoxy reads -- that's also worth noting. It is one way, and one with immense practical value. But it can easily be abused, which is I think something of which the Church is well aware. One of the chief forms of abuse is to see it as the only form of reading, which allows too strong a disfiguration of various messages in the patristic testimony (some of this has happened with Nestorianism; far more, to my mind, with Origen).

INXC, Matthew

Dear Matthew,

Many thanks for this, which raises a point that was beginning to puzzle me, as one might have misread some of the other posts as implying that there was a set way of doing Patristic history - which would have made it unique in academic terms!

Of course one can see that the ascetical-pastoral model yields good fruit, in the right hands; but the same would be true of any model, with the same caveat. The question of authority seems to raise itself here, and I was interested in your comment that


But the great challenge posed comes in the question of the how, and also the 'who' behind the how -- namely, how the Church sorts through the patristic heritage in this manner, and who within the Church does so. There is no single answer to either question; this is simply part of the way patristic Christianity has always worked, much more a collective assembly of pastoral reading and application than a systematic attempt at a standardised reading. But there are various loci of reading and application: the councils, and perhaps even more notably the liturgical

and I wondered if you might be persuaded to expand on this a little?

We use 'the Church' as a shorthand, in just the way Fr. Raphael describes the Church as using various labels; like all shorthand, these are needful for the conduct of daily life; we can't be for ever stopping and refining definitions, and the faithful have to have guidance.

'A collective assembly of pastoral reading and application' is a splendid description, which you ought to copyright, but might you be tempted to write a little more about the 'various loci of reading and application'?


INXC

John

[Tanya Hoadley]

Greetings All,

Question:

If I were to introduce a line of thought into the Church that was the seed of heresy, as the author of the seed should I be held blameless? For the sake clarity, wouldn't the heresy be labled "Tanyaism" as I would be the originator even if I didn't proclaim but even rebuked the resulting heresy?

Just food for thought,

In Christ,
Tanya

[Peter Farrington]

Hi Tanya

Perhaps, unless you repudiated the position which came to be called 'Tanyaism'.

Also, following your reasonable suggestion the teaching of Nestorius should be called Theodoreanism since he is the towering figure behind Nestorius who was a very weak theologian, and that is what I suggested earlier in the thread.

Nestorius was not the originator of any heresy, it was already there, and it was only because of the likelihood of the Church being split apart that St Cyril did not openly condemn Theodore.

So I have no problem with saying that Nestorius was a Theodorean, but I don't think he was a Nestorian. Indeed the Church of the East who venerate Nestorius do not consider themselves Nestorians either, but also look to Theodore of Mopsuestia as their great Father in the way that many of us look to St Cyril.

Now if you can come up with a novel heresy, a difficult matter nowadays with so many, then I will make sure that I give you the dubious honour of being a Tanyaite and founding Tanyaism, but if you are only repeating an older heresy then I think it clearest to refer to that label.

I hope it is clear that I have no problem with the term Nestorianism as a rather misplaced label for something clear, but I do think that it is more useful and much more important to refer his dubious ideas to their creator, Theodore, since it was Theodore's ideas which the 5th council had to deal with, not Nestorius'. It is possible to reject Nestorius as a person but still be a Theodorean, that is why I prefer to look at the origin of his error.

Best wishes

Peter

[Ian Leyda]

If Nestorius is a dog, to use Matthew's analogy, then it is always untrue to call him a cat. We may call him a mammal. We may describe the similarity of his body to that of a cat. But if he is a dog then we are not telling the truth if we say he is a cat.

Peter

Peter,

I just wanted to say that I thought this bit of logic was marvelously funny. Truly, it is the funniest thing I have read all day.

But, I would agree that Nestorius was at least a mammal.


With much thanks,

Ian

[Ian Leyda]

When we say "labels," I generally assume we are talking about "categories of thought." Thus, it is reasonable to assume the more general use of a term unless it is more qualified in its context.

When somebody uses the term "Nestorianism" or the name "Nestorius," I assume they are talking about his two Sons Christology.

But when I see that the conversation has turned to "Well, Nestorius was not a Nestorian," it seems to me that the sense within the argument has mostly fallen on hard times.

The helpful boundaries that govern the meaning of our words have been lost, and the result is chaos. You can never get back to the real point.

The "fairness" issue at hand here is allowing words and labels to carry their meaning through the argument. It is to seek agreement on the meaning of the words so as to understand the idea which it escorts.

To strive to be "fair" is to honor boundaries, categories, rules of engagement. And we do so because we sincerely seek the truth in debate, we seek the best player in the game, we seek to challenge our understanding. And most of all, we believe that order and "fairness" serve the interests of everyone involved. Surely, "fairness" is not an invention of the modern mind or the goal of a cynic.

Will we attack a person's point assuming a nuanced meaning of Nestorianism? Then we end up debating and philosophizing about what the meaning of "is" is, and thinking it sounds profound. We have even parsed "selfish" and "arrogant" in the past few days. We parse words and then we do not attend at all to the person's point.

As I recall, the topic was initially "Original Sin." Of course, I will not presume to be so bold as to point out the one who started it.

Peace,

Ian

[Peter Farrington]

Hi Ian

I am sorry that the thread has produced confusion in your mind.

Yes, I agree that labels are useful means of describing categories of thought, but when you say,


When somebody uses the term "Nestorianism" or the name "Nestorius," I assume they are talking about his two Sons Christology.

you have assumed that Nestorius had a two Sons Christology. Of course your own studies may lead you to conclude that he did, but in fact he resolutely and insistently rejected the assertion.

So the question,

"Was Nestorius a Nestorian?"

is not perhaps as lacking in sense as I think you conclude. If Nestorius did not hold to the category of thought which is classified in the label 'Nestorianism' then he was not a Nestorian. We can take the same view with many other people.

"Was Pelagius a Pelagian?". It would seem not, although some of his extreme followers appear to have been and are liable to the judgements issues against 'Pelagianism'.

"Was Augustine an Augustinian?" etc etc.

It probably doesn't matter so much in ordinary conversation whether Nestorius was a Nestorian or not, I am not often discussing the subject with colleagues here at work. :-) But it does seem to matter for my own integrity and in my own studies. He was certainly in error, but I am not at all convinced, quite the contrary, that the gross heresy attributed to him is one that he ever shared. If he did not, then personally I do not feel easy using a category to describe his thought which does not actually describe his thought.

Thinking more about labels, I am not sure that any of the Fathers use the term Nestorianism in any case. Looking through, for instance, the 5th council, they statements made are in the form 'If anyone says...' which seems much better and more precise than 'If anyone is a Nestorian...' It does take a greater focus on what people themselves believe, although we do still have the issue of whether we understand each other.

Labels can be very helpful and are necessary, we use them all the time, but sometimes they can preclude a proper understanding.

"Oh,..he's an American", "Oh,..he's a convert", "Oh,..he's a traditionalist/liberal", "Oh,..he's a Greek/Russian/Copt/Armenian".

These are all labels which can be very usefulin some contexts , but they can also prevent understanding in other contexts.

Best wishes

Peter

[M.C. Steenberg]

So the question,

"Was Nestorius a Nestorian?"

is not perhaps as lacking in sense as I think you conclude. If Nestorius did not hold to the category of thought which is classified in the label 'Nestorianism' then he was not a Nestorian. We can take the same view with many other people.


I must say that, while I have enjoyed many of the qualifications put forward in this discussion, I do still feel that -- and in some sense in agreement with the views others have expressed in this thread -- this is a way of reading the fathers that is true and right in one specific context; but rather facile or simplistic in others. It does seem to be a re-characterisation of points made earlier here, without necessarily taking on board the other realms of reading and patristic dynamic to which people have tried to draw attention.

I do not think any sensible person would deny the quoted statement as a specific look at solely the self-identification and self-profession of Nestorius the person. But the point that has been drawn out by many in this thread is that this simply isn't adequate to real understanding of patristic thought in its fuller measure.

But the repeated re-statement of the point has, indeed, become something of a bar to real discussion. Ultimately, if one believes that this sentiment is the end-all of how to read these issues, and won't look past this, there is little to study or discuss, or critically assess.

INXC, Matthew

[Peter Farrington]

I am sorry that you feel that way Matthew. It certainly isn't my intention.

I am replying to a post which seems to state that Nestorianism is an obvious heresy of teaching two Sons and since it bears the name of Nestorius it must be his heresy.

This was also the view expressed a couple of posts back where the analogy of Tanyaism was used.

I am well aware that the Fathers can be read in many ways, but I do not find them using the label of 'Nestorianism'. Therefore it seems entirely reasonable to ask whether Nestorius was a Nestorian, what the term Nestorian is taken to mean, who is using it, and why.

The Church of the East does not consider itself to be Nestorian. This seems important to me. They find the term rather offensive. This seems important to me at least. I find that I want to examine my own use of a label that does not adequately describe what another group believes.

But I sense that my position is itself not being understood and only causing problems for people so I will bow out of this thread.

Peter

[Athanasius Abdullah]

Dear all,

+irini nem ehmot,

With regard to the issue of classifying a person/Church according to the implications of what they have positively professed in spite of what they explicitly deny, the question of fairness still lingers. Is the implication derived, one that is derived reasonably (and hence fairly) at that, or is it one that is unreasonably (and hence unfairly) imputed upon the person in question? After all, the Church itself was accused of professing the faith in a manner that implied certain doctrines that the Church itself would acknowledge as heretical (e.g. Nicaeans were accused of Sabellianism and Ephesians of Apollinarianism etc.)

This question is one that needs to be treated with much sensitivity and empathy especially when approaching those of other ‘Churches’ who work within a differing ‘patristic framework’. It’s easy for me to tell a Nestorian, “well it’s still fair that my Church deem Nestorius a Two-Sonist because such was deemed to be the implications of his teaching, regardless of his explicit repudiation of the notion of Two Sons”, but he/she will simply discredit my claim as being too subjective, for that certainly isn’t the implication he/she derives from Nestorius’ teachings. What standards can be employed in objectively axcertaining that which may be deemed a “fair and reasonable” inference of another’s manner of expressing doctrine?

For the record, I personally uphold the idea that Nestorius was a Nestorian in consideration of the implications of his Christology. In fact, this issue was the subject of an oral presentation I had to give last year in my ‘Birth of Christianity’ class at Sydney University. Here is part of the introduction to that presentation:

The two main questions I endeavor to answer in my presentation are as follows:

1) Was Nestorius’ Christology ‘Nestorian’?
2) Was Nestorius’ Christology Heteredox?

The first question can essentially be re-phrased: Did Nestorius ascribe to the doctrines of two-sonism and adoptionism—the doctrines traditionally characterized of Nestorius by his ecclesiastical opponents. The second question—presuming the Christology of Cyril of Alexandria to be representative of normative Orthodox tradition (a presumption I have been allowed to take for granted by Professor Gardner for the purpose of this presentation)—essentially asks whether Nestorius actually deviated from the Christology of Cyril, or whether or not the fifth century dispute was all a big misunderstanding based on semantic and terminological issues, or even as some scholars suggest, whether or not the polemical correspondence carried out between the two was simply a sophism masking the real political power struggle of the archiepiscopal sees.

The questions I have raised can be answered either affirmatively or negatively according to two different standards which I, as a student of law presently studying criminal law, have learnt to apply in considering an accused’s criminal liability according to that accused’s mens rea or mental fault component.

The first of these legal standards is subjective: the one on trial is judged according to his actual intention. In this way, we are concerned with adopting the mind of Nestorius and consequently his thoughts (no matter how confused, inconsistent, or incoherent they may appear to be) in order to establish the Christology he subjectively intended to convey. According to this subjective standard, I will be answer the former question negatively, and the latter positively.

The second of these legal standards is objective: the one on trial is judged according to a standard of how the ordinary and reasonable person would interpret Nestorius’ Christology and its logical implications. On this basis I shall answer affirmatively for both questions.

In IC XC
-Athanasius

[Peter Farrington]

Hi Athanasius

I'd like to see the rest of your presentation at some time.

The only issue I have with taking a more juridistic methodogy is that the issue of objectivity is not so objective.

It is the case, for instance, that St Cyril's thought was read by a great many ordinary people who interpreted it as teaching a confusion of the humanity and divinity. Likewise there are many people who have looked at anti-Chalcedonian Christology and objectively decided it is Eutychian, just as there are many of our brethen who look objectively at the Chalcedonian position and conclude it is Nestorian, and I am sure that there were many objective Arians, Sabellians, etc etc.

It seems to me that 'objectivity' is too 'subjective' in fact.

I have no problem with describing a position as heretical and then showing how the implications of someones actual position could lead to such a heresy. My problem is that when someone sets boundaries themselves to their own position then it is unreasonable to act as if they have not been set. We may still conclude a persons position is incoherent, not very clear, liable to misunderstanding, and even error and heresy, but I do not see that we can claim that THIS person accepts a position they have set boundaries to exclude.

The situation was exactly the same for St Cyril. People were taking is words and following them to a conclusion, but it was a conclusion he explicitly rejected and excluded from a proper interpretation of his position.

In my own experience, I can speak of 'one incarnate nature', just as St Cyril did, and find myself accused of exactly the same error, by people who are being objective according to their own understanding, but that is exactly where the subjectivity comes in. A person who understand 'one incarnate nature' in a manner that I do not intend, cannot be reasonably said to have objectively considered what I have said.

I think that the examples you describe, of the Church being accused of Apollinarianism and Sabellianism etc are good ones because they show that it is not possible to be quite so objective as we might like to think we are. We are very much influenced by our own understanding, experience and prejudices. These examples show that people can easily be wrong when imputing error to others, not that the error itself is wrongly classified, but that it is not so straightforward to apply a generalised category to individuals.

I guess that my main issue, as a personal one, is that of cursing people, and excluding them from life in the Church, and ultimately considering them as lost and hellbound on the basis of a classification which might not be accurate, and then having that classification 'canonised' as it were, whether later evidence proves it misplaced or otherwise, so that it can never be reconsidered. I have great personal problems with this, since it impacts directly on the way that I relate to people outside my Orthodox communion.

Best wishes

Peter

[John Charmley]

... the repeated re-statement of the point has, indeed, become something of a bar to real discussion. Ultimately, if one believes that this sentiment is the end-all of how to read these issues, and won't look past this, there is little to study or discuss, or critically assess.

INXC, Matthew

Dear Matthew,
That would indeed be the case, and it was perhaps unfortunate that we took a loop back to deal with old Nestorius again, where the narrower point was relevant, but not all-embracing (and I suspect no one thought it was).

Some posts ago (of course before it got exciting!) I asked a very pedestrian question which I'm going to risk repeating, because it may have got lost and it may be highly relevant to leading this one forward.

Matthew wrote:

But the great challenge posed comes in the question of the how, and also the 'who' behind the how -- namely, how the Church sorts through the patristic heritage in this manner, and who within the Church does so. There is no single answer to either question; this is simply part of the way patristic Christianity has always worked, much more a collective assembly of pastoral reading and application than a systematic attempt at a standardised reading. But there are various loci of reading and application

It would be good if this great challenge could be taken up. The 'various loci of reading and application' are clearly key here, and I suspect it would get us onto a useful part of this discussion if you were able to elaborate on this a little further.


INXC

John

[John Charmley]

Dear Brothers and sisters in Christ,

A while back, Matthew posted:

But the great challenge posed comes in the question of the how, and also the 'who' behind the how -- namely, how the Church sorts through the patristic heritage in this manner, and who within the Church does so. There is no single answer to either question; this is simply part of the way patristic Christianity has always worked, much more a collective assembly of pastoral reading and application than a systematic attempt at a standardised reading. But there are various loci of reading and application

It may just be me who would find it interesting to explore the 'various loci of reading and application', but if others are, it might be useful to hear from them.

This was particularly brought to my mind by a programme on the television called 'The Lost Gospels' in which an Anglican clergyman disguised as an Indiana Jones lookalike came out with a sub-Dan Brown line about the 'lost gospels' being 'suppressed' by the 'Church hierarchy' by which he seemed to mean the Vatican.

Monachos readers will be well aware of the various levels of fuzzy thinking involved in such 'explanations', but it reminded me of the more complex and nuanced way in which Orthodoxy explains the interaction between canonical scripture and the Church - which set me thinking again about the ways in which Holy Tradition is received and passed on.

In Christ,

John

[Fr Raphael Vereshack]

Dear Brothers and sisters in Christ,

A while back, Matthew posted:


It may just be me who would find it interesting to explore the 'various loci of reading and application', but if others are, it might be useful to hear from them.

This was particularly brought to my mind by a programme on the television called 'The Lost Gospels' in which an Anglican clergyman disguised as an Indiana Jones lookalike came out with a sub-Dan Brown line about the 'lost gospels' being 'suppressed' by the 'Church hierarchy' by which he seemed to mean the Vatican.

Monachos readers will be well aware of the various levels of fuzzy thinking involved in such 'explanations', but it reminded me of the more complex and nuanced way in which Orthodoxy explains the interaction between canonical scripture and the Church - which set me thinking again about the ways in which Holy Tradition is received and passed on.

In Christ,

John


This has always deeply interested me also but more from a spiritual/pastoral level since it is critical to the life of the Church that we learn what to listen to from the various voices within the Church. Being completely open-minded leads to being overwhelmed by a cacophony of voices whereas a certain kind of sensitivity can unexpectedly indicate the way forward.

I imagine the Church to be like a school playground which has defined boundaries. Within these boundaries many activities are going on some collective & others individual. From within this ground a total impression is made which gradually shifts in focus over time although retaining its unity of vision.

It's incredible how this happens with so many voices. Both parishes and seminaries are good examples of this. As anyone can see from experience although many things may be planted only a few sprout and bear fruit. There is some sort of mysterious way in which the Church winnows out what is offered. Some things are thrown out immediately, others fall into the soil and await their proper time to germinate, while other seeds grow immediately in the full light of day.

One thing is sure and that is that we have no real overall control over this process within the Church. No matter what we offer even if it bears fruit this will remain invisible to us so that we cannot recognize the fruit as our own- which indeed it is not- when it finally bears fruit.

Certainly it is from experiencing this way in which the life of the Church works and has continued to do so through the ages which has convinced us of how the Church is continually guided by the Holy Spirit.

If we kept focussed only on detail & whether each voice was heard we probably would never recognize how the Church was guided in its way by the Holy Spirit. But if we are free in how we see the relationship between what is offered and what is taken up by the Church then I think we can really see how the Holy Spirit is at work in and guides the Church.

In Christ- Fr Raphael

[Owen Jones]

I think one of the problems created in some patristic debates over doctrine is the limitations of the current physical sciences from which were drawn terms such as nature and substance. But I'm not educated enough to take it much further than that. This is not to suggest that doctrinal "labels" should be re-written. But the Fathers were certainly influenced by the then current state of the physical sciences.

[Owen Jones]

I am posting this quote to try to demonstrate the importance of understanding, or trying to understand theology not as a set of definitions but as a process. Understanding what is going on -- what we are doing or attempting to do, as well as the inherent limitations, is an important precondition to to understanding the meaning of the words and their implications:

Perhaps this quote, coming from a philosophical context, will be illuminating:

The Purpose of Theory (IV):
The Theological Principle

The anthropological principle, thus, must be supplemented by a second principle for the theoretical interpretation of society. Plato expressed it when he created his formula "God is the Measure," in opposition to the Protagorean "Man is the Measure."

In formulating this principle, Plato drew the sum of a long development. His ancestor Solon already had been in search of the truth that could be imposed with authority on the factions of Athens, and with a sigh he admitted, "It is very hard to know the unseen measure of right judgment—and yet it alone contains the right boundaries of all things." As a statesman he lived in the tension between the unseen measure and the necessity of incarnating it in the eunomia of society; on the one hand: "The mind of the immortals is all unseen to men"; and on the other hand: "At the behest of the gods have I done what I did."

Heraclitus, then, who always looms as the great shadow behind the ideas of Plato, went deeper into the experiences leading toward the invisible measure. He recognized its overruling validity: "The invisible harmony is better (or: greater, more powerful) than the visible." But this invisible harmony is difficult to find, and it will not be found at all unless the soul be animated by an anticipating urge in the right direction: "If you do not hope you will not find the unhoped-for, since it is hard to be found and the way is all but impassable," and: "Through lack of faith (apistie) the divine(?) escapes being known."

And, finally, Plato has absorbed the Xenophantic critique of unseemly symbolization of the gods. As long as men create gods in their image, is the argument of Xenophanes, the true nature of the one God who is "greatest among gods and men, not like mortals in body or thought," must remain hidden; and only when the one God is understood in his formless transcendence as the same God for every man will the nature of every man be understood as the same by virtue of the sameness of his relation to the transcendent divinity. Of all the early Greek thinkers, Xenophanes had perhaps the clearest insight into the constitution of a universal idea of man through the experience of universal transcendence.


CW Vol 5,
THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS
Chapter 2
Representation and Truth
§6 pp 142-143.
[U.Chicago ed., p 68-69]

[Owen Jones]

Then there is this -- having to do with the relations between ideas and existence:


The Philosopher's Field of
Experiences and Symbols

To gain the understanding of his own humanity, and to order his life in the light of insight gained, has been the concern of man in history as far back as the written records go. If today a philosopher turns reflectively toward the area of reality called human existence, he does not discover it as a terra incognita, but moves among symbols concerning the truth of existence which represent the experiences of his predecessors.

This field of experiences and symbols is neither an object to be observed from the outside, nor does it present the same appearance to everybody. It rather is the time dimension of existence, accessible only through participation in its reality; and what the philosopher moving in the field will see or not see, understand of not understand, or whether he will find his bearings in it at all, depends on the manner in which his own existence has been formed through intellectual discipline in openness toward reality, or deformed by his uncritical acceptance of beliefs which obscure the reality of immediate experience.


CW Vol 12,
Experience and Symbolization in History
p 116.
BACK TO THE TOP

[Owen Jones]

then there is this:


The Purpose of Theory (V):
Receptivity for the Unseen Measure

The truth of man and the truth of God are inseparably one. Man will be in the truth of his existence when he has opened his psyche to the truth of God; and the truth of God will become manifest in history when it has formed the psyche of man into receptivity for the unseen measure. This is the great subject of the Republic; at the center of the dialogue Plato placed the Parable of the Cave, with its description of the periagoge, the conversion, the turning-around from the untruth of human existence as it prevailed in the Athenian sophistic society to the truth of the Idea.

Moreover, Plato understood that the best way of securing the truth of existence was proper education from early childhood; for that reason, in Republic ii, he wanted to remove unseemly symbolizations of the gods, as they were to be found in the poets, from the education of the young and have them replaced by seemly symbols. On this occasion he developed the technical vocabulary for dealing with such problems. In order to speak of the various types of symbolization, he coined the term "theology" and called them types of theology, typoi peri theologias.

On the same occasion Plato, furthermore, distinguished the gnoseological component of the problem. If the soul is exposed in its youth to the wrong type of theology, it will be warped at its decisive center where it knows about the nature of God; it will fall a prey to the "arch-lie," the alethos pseudos, of misconception about the gods. This lie is not an ordinary lie in daily life for which there may be extenuating circumstances; it is the supreme lie of "ignorance, of agnoia, within the soul."

If now the Platonic terminology be adopted, one may say, therefore, that the anthropological principle in a theoretical interpretation of society requires the theological principle as its correlate. The validity of the standards developed by Plato and Aristotle depends on the conception of a man who can be the measure of society because God is the measure of his soul.


CW Vol 5,
THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS
Chapter 2
Representation and Truth
§6 p 143.
[U.Chicago ed., p 69-70]

[Owen Jones]

On the matter of Divine Truth and representation:


The Purpose of Theory (III):
The Openness of the Soul as the New Authority

[The examples given] should be sufficient to evoke the class of experiences that form the basis of theory in the Platonic-Aristotelian sense. It must now be ascertained why they should become the carriers of a truth about human existence in rivalry with the truth of the older myth, and why the theorist, as the representative of this truth, should be able to pit his authority against the authority of society.

The answer to this question must be sought in the nature of the experience under discussion. The discovery of the new truth is not an advancement of psychological knowledge in the immanentist sense; one would rather have to say that the psyche itself is found as a new center in man at which he experiences himself as open toward transcendental reality.

Moreover, this center is not found as if it were an object that had been present all the time and only escaped notice. The psyche as the region in which transcendence is experienced must be differentiated out of a more compact structure of the soul; it must be developed and named. With due regard for the problem of compactness and differentiation, one might almost say that before the discovery of the psyche man had no soul. Hence, it is a discovery that produces its experiential material along with its explication; the openness of the soul is experienced through the opening of the soul itself. This opening, which is as much action as it is passion, we owe to the genius of the mystic philosophers.

These experiences become the source of a new authority. Through the opening of the soul the philosopher finds himself in a new relation with God; he not only discovers his own psyche as the instrument for experiencing transcendence but at the same time discovers the divinity in its radically nonhuman transcendence.

Hence, the differentiation of the psyche is inseparable from a new truth about God. The true order of the soul can become the standard for measuring both human types and types of social order because it represents the truth about human existence on the border of transcendence. The meaning of the anthropological principle must, therefore, be qualified by the understanding that what becomes the instrument of social critique is, not an arbitrary idea of man as a world-immanent being, but the idea of a man who has found his true nature through finding his true relation to God. The new measure that is found for the critique of society is, indeed, not man himself but man in so far as through the differentiation of his psyche he has become the representative of divine truth.


CW Vol 5,
THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS
Chapter 2
Representation and Truth
§6 pp 140-142.
[U.Chicago ed., p 66-68]

[Owen Jones]

And a reminder that the Church is representative in more than one sense:



THE CHURCH AND HUMANITY IV:
The Church's Duty and Failure to Represent Humanity

. . . . The church exists in relation to the world and thus must also define its behavior with regard to the temporal aspect of its existence in the world. On both sides, the spiritual side from revelation and the noetic side from philosophy, the representative function—being human in history has traditionally been encumbered by the fact that the insight became part of the respective dogma.

This means, that on the one side, the temporal side, there is the insight that the order of society has to be at the level of humanity— in the sense that the nature of man achieves fulfillment in the order of society and has to determine its order. But this insight is restricted, because the order only occurs within a limited community, so that the interests of the limited community in history enter into an amalgam with the general problematic of order at the level of humanity. And the particular interests of a society can thus appear in the cloak of more universal formulations of humanity—and thereby again denature and deform humanity in general.

In the church, the matter is even more critical, because here we have the problem that there is not one particular church but several concrete churches, Evangelical, Catholic, Greek-Orthodox Churches, and so on, each one claiming for itself the specific purity of representation of man under God, which only they can preach. Moreover, this specific historical form again amalgamates with the claim of generality, so that this church with the claim of generality, since it must indeed exist in the world and in specific societies, somehow balances its interests with those of the temporal aspect of the society.

We come again then to the grotesque situations that when a war breaks out anywhere, the priests on both sides willingly explain that the society is engaged in a just war, that the others are really bad types, and that God is always on their side. Always the same God.

That can, in the extreme case, as we have seen in Germany in the National Socialist period, lead to the fact, first, that from the purely ecclesiastical problematic no one is seen as human who does not belong to the church—he lies outside the interests of humanity. And second, when it's a matter of coming to terms with the temporal aspect of the society, the respective church in the specific society will always side with those who are the strongest at the time. And if those who are strongest, as for example the National Socialists, exclude from humanity everyone who is not a National Socialist, then arises the terrible consequence of mass murder, where the church does not intervene.

You must remember, for example, that the Einsatz commandos— who, to make Lebensraum for Germans, perpetrated mass murder on the civilian population in Poland in order to exterminate Poles— were 22 percent Catholic. Yet no representative of the German Catholic Church, and even less any representative of the German Evangelical Church, told any of these members of the SS (if they themselves did not know that already), who very happily still remained members of the church, that one was not allowed to shoot people dead. So, a complete decline, because the historically concrete actions were encumbered with the National Socialist idea that they were representative of the whole of humanity, with the result that the general humanity gets lost.
CW VOL 31,
CHAPTER 5
Descent into the Eccleisiastic Abyss
The Catholic Church ,
pp 209-211.