Mysteries, doctrine, and the limitations of words

[John Uebersax]

I have a basic logical/philosophical question, but one which applies especially to religious doctrine. Its precise formulation, mathematical in nature, may most interest members with a mathematical or engineering background; but the basic issue is of broader concern:

It appears to me that a mathematical-logical proof might be made to the effect that any attempt to express religious mysteries in finite doctrinal statements will produce apparent paradoxes.

I will sketch the 'proof' next, but my main question is broader: to what extent has the limitation of literal language for expressing religious doctrine been studied or acknowledged by theologians?

At some level it seems obvious that words are very limited. But despite this we formulate authoritative doctrinal statements. One would think this issue must have received serious attention: how we can formulate authoritative doctrines given the extreme limitedness, imprecision, and ambiguity of words? Could anyone perhaps suggest Catholic theologians -- modern or ancient -- who have discussed this issue?

I won't go into specifics here, but it seems like the doctrine of the Trinity is a good example of how this principle may apply -- because we attempt to define the idea doctrinally, yet also concede that it is "a mystery". It also seems related in a general way to historical disputes between Chalcedonian and other positions -- but for now I would much prefer to focus on the more general issue.

Now, my idea (which, as I say, is less important than the more general question above):


We may represent conceptual knowledge mathematically, in terms of points located in an N-dimensional space. Explanation: conceptual knowledge relates to objects and attributes; for N attributes, we may define a space of N dimensions; any object in the conceptual domain may be represented by a point in this space at a specific location.

Religious matters, such as the qualities of God, the nature of religious experience, etc., we may suppose to occupy a space of infinitely many dimensions, or else some very large number.

In contrast, the language and theories by which we attempt to describe God or religious experience are necessarily very limited.

We are thus in the situation of projecting a high-dimensional space into a space of fewer (and few) dimensions. This inevitably produces distortion in the lower-dimensional representation. For example, points that are distant in the higher-dimensional space may appear close in the lower-dimensional space.

We could elaborate this model to show how various paradoxes may easily (or inevitably) result from trying to explain or formulate religious theories in terms of a finite vocabulary of terms, attributes, relationships, etc.


I don't know if this will interest anyone here or not; I might try running the idea past some other mathematicians, per perhaps some linguists. But the more important question is the general one: how can there be authoritative doctrine given the limitations of written words?

John Uebersax

[M.C. Steenberg]

Dear Mr Uebersax,

The challenge your articulate in your post, namely the relationship of finite language to discussion of the infinite God, was the topic of intense debate between AD 360-380, in the period sometimes known as 'neo-Arian'. More properly, the debates of the period centre around the language used (and promoted) by Eunomius and Aetius (not really followers of Arius, hence the problem with the normal title for the period), for whom, at least in the characterisations of the fathers that opposed them, the main problem resided in their desire to make dogmatic statements about God, equate to God in his nature.

The father's you'll want to read on the matter, who are the classic respondents to it, are St Gregory of Nyssa (in particular) and St Gregory of Nazianzus.

INXC, Dcn Matthew

[Paul Cowan]

Dear Dr Uebersax,

I am not a mathematician nor a linguist, but if you will allow me....

I have always been pretty good of putting things into a more common denominator [that's a math word :)] where I can more easily understand them.

God is "up" there. I can't see Him, but I know He is there. My perception of Him is definitely distorted because no man has ever seen Him. How do we describe someone we have never seen? poorly.

Paradox: Since I can't see Him clearly, He kinda looks like me. So now I am god because I have no better words to describe what I don't understand. Since the words I use to understand are so poor, I can make them mean whatever I want.

The single best antidote for myself grandeur is what happened in Acts. "It seemed good to us and the Holy Spirit." (The Spirit of Truth). By listening to God since He said "don't worry what you shall say, it will be given to you in the hour you need it", He will teach us all things even to the point of helping us create new words. homosousia? ( I don't know how to spell it sorry).

Yes, I know I am way over my head in this conversation so I will bow out now.

Paul

[John Uebersax]

The father's you'll want to read on the matter, who are the classic respondents to it, are St Gregory of Nyssa (in particular) and St Gregory of Nazianzus.

Thank you very much. This is what I was looking for. Can you suggest titles of any particular works by these fathers?

John

[RichardWorthington]

Its precise formulation, mathematical in nature, may most interest members with a mathematical or engineering background; but the basic issue is of broader concern:


Hi - I'm a mathematician!!

However, concerning using mathematical methods for knowledge of God, I "count them as rubbish, that I may gain Christ" (Phil. 3:8). For the "excellence of the knowledge of Christ Jesus" our Lord excels worldly knowledge as light excels darkness.

Do we live by logic, or by the Logos, the Word of God who died for us and in Whom we live?

Richard
PS Sorry to preach - but I thought I would make the comparison! :)

[Zakk Price]

I have a basic logical/philosophical question, but one which applies especially to religious doctrine. Its precise formulation, mathematical in nature, may most interest members with a mathematical or engineering background; but the basic issue is of broader concern:

It appears to me that a mathematical-logical proof might be made to the effect that any attempt to express religious mysteries in finite doctrinal statements will produce apparent paradoxes.

I will sketch the 'proof' next, but my main question is broader: to what extent has the limitation of literal language for expressing religious doctrine been studied or acknowledged by theologians?

At some level it seems obvious that words are very limited. But despite this we formulate authoritative doctrinal statements. One would think this issue must have received serious attention: how we can formulate authoritative doctrines given the extreme limitedness, imprecision, and ambiguity of words? Could anyone perhaps suggest Catholic theologians -- modern or ancient -- who have discussed this issue?

I won't go into specifics here, but it seems like the doctrine of the Trinity is a good example of how this principle may apply -- because we attempt to define the idea doctrinally, yet also concede that it is "a mystery". It also seems related in a general way to historical disputes between Chalcedonian and other positions -- but for now I would much prefer to focus on the more general issue.

Now, my idea (which, as I say, is less important than the more general question above):


We may represent conceptual knowledge mathematically, in terms of points located in an N-dimensional space. Explanation: conceptual knowledge relates to objects and attributes; for N attributes, we may define a space of N dimensions; any object in the conceptual domain may be represented by a point in this space at a specific location.
Religious matters, such as the qualities of God, the nature of religious experience, etc., we may suppose to occupy a space of infinitely many dimensions, or else some very large number.
In contrast, the language and theories by which we attempt to describe God or religious experience are necessarily very limited.
We are thus in the situation of projecting a high-dimensional space into a space of fewer (and few) dimensions. This inevitably produces distortion in the lower-dimensional representation. For example, points that are distant in the higher-dimensional space may appear close in the lower-dimensional space.
We could elaborate this model to show how various paradoxes may easily (or inevitably) result from trying to explain or formulate religious theories in terms of a finite vocabulary of terms, attributes, relationships, etc.


I don't know if this will interest anyone here or not; I might try running the idea past some other mathematicians, per perhaps some linguists. But the more important question is the general one: how can there be authoritative doctrine given the limitations of written words?

John Uebersax

Hello!

I realize that this thread had fallen asleep, as it were, some time ago, but it is just the kind of thing that I find irresistible.

To quickly answer your request for theologians who have addressed the relationship of language to mystery, you might look into St. Augustine's "On Christian Teaching" and "The Teacher", as well as Bonaventure's "The Soul's Journey into God." On the Orthodox side, I strongly recommend reading the complete works of St. Dionysios the Areopagite.

And now your overall concern:
Clearly, if a word is limited to a single one-to-one correspondence with its concept, we will very quickly run out of linguistic tokens to describe the mysteries of God. Assuming this limit, we must eventually start using words to artificially signify things they do not, resulting in the apparent paradoxes about which you are concerned.

Allow me to suggest that we adopt a different notion of language, since these paradoxes are a result of your rather limited view of language. Martin Heidegger once wrote that "language is the house of being." I believe this image is extremely helpful to us, as Christians, since it illustrates the incarnational aspect of language. Saint Maximos the Confessor describes the Incarnation of the Lord Jesus Christ in a very telling way, saying, "the Word . . . became flesh to be with us and was thickened in syllables and letters." [St. Maximos the Confessor, Difficulty 10, 18.1129D. Emphasis added.] Another Father, Saint John Damascene, tells us that we are images of God due to the fact that we imitate Him. [See St. John Damascene, On the Holy Icons, 3.20.]

I derive from these reflections the principle that we incarnate some intended way of being in words. This is an energetic, as opposed to hypostatic, incarnation. Thus, those hearing our words have the opportunity to participate in our meaning. This opportunity is mediated by the hearer's own hermeneutical commitments, allowing for the phenomenon of misinterpretation, but my point remains the same.

If I have been correct so far, it would seem that the problem of apparent paradox is not one of the content of the words we use to articulate mysteries but with their interpretation.

Hopefully this was helpful. I apologize if it seems left-field, and can only suggest that approaching some of my terminology from a Continental standpoint may help to clear away any confusion. I am interested to hear your further thoughts.

- Dionysios Zachary Price

[Vasiliki D.]

Excuse my simplistic reply to this post I couldnt resist.

The reason why non-Orthodox Christian groups have many problems with this, as you describe, is because the are trying to define God.

For those who carefully observe the words used in the Orhtodox church will notice that the church does not describe God rather it describes what God is not.

This is a linguistic trick and there is a name for it ... I dont know the name. I can only try to explain what I mean and why it is so. To really know what I mean, one must study the services in the original context which is Greek abd this pattern is then detectable. So, in Greek, you will find the words describing God starting with "a" that infer what God ISNT.

Example, God is "athanatos".

The reason the church describes what he isnt rather than what he is ... is simple and was pointed out in the earlier post - who has seen God to know what he is? We can only know what he isnt! This is an approach to God in humility .. where as to try to give him a definition of what he is .. tends to be more ... arrogant! Hence the churches avoidance of words that lock him down to a particular characteristic.

I wonder if anyone else can help me to explain this more .. since, it contradicts a mathematical equation when you describe what he isnt ...

[Anna Stickles]

the church does not describe God rather it describes what God is not.



???

God is omnipotent, God is love, God is righteous... there are certainly many positive statements made about God.

What the Church guards against is dogmatic understandings of God that would harm the faith and life of those within it. In this sense what the Church does is negative. It says which understandings are clearly false without trying to absolutely define the True. When I say false here, I don't mean propositionally false the way things are in logic, but rather more along the lines of what we say when a person is false, -- they are unreliable, deceitful, untrustworthy.

[Vasiliki D.]

With respect Anna, I did not actually say that definitions of God are negative or positive. So, I was not actually inferring that the way we describe God with English words is bad or good ... I was making a point about the original language of the church; I am not in a position to compare the shift in the way a modern theologian approached describing God since, like the poster above mentioned, the use of the English language is much more limited in its scope as compared to some of the more ancient languages - Greek, Latin, Hebrew etc.

However, it is a fact ... the way God is described in the original context is by using words that describe what God isnt ... so, the words selected by the fathers of the church THEN (and again I repeat) describe what God is not ... [and one example I gave was "athanatos"] ... and not what he is.

it is just something I have noticed and always thought was quite clever on their behalf ... I actually think it has a deep theological basis to it but never really explored by anyone.

Anyway, its pointless to go on further unless we have someone who is qualified in linguistics and etymology ... really.