Mia physis

[Daniel Smith]

I am a Greek orthodox convert. I have studied Ephesus and Chalcedon alot, and I think I have a fair grasp of the issues that were at hand. My question is: Is it really valid to say that a union of natures in ANY sense was made? My reason for asking this is:

1. If Christ united the Human nature to his divine nature elementally, then we have a confused nature. AND Since the divine nature is not proper to CHrist alone, it is tantamount to saying that all three persons of the blessed trinity have taken on the nature of Christ's Humanity. This would be why Peter the Fuller ADDED "...who was crucified for us..." to the trisagion. Classic Monophysitism. The Copts, Armenians, Ethiopians, Eritreans, Syrians and Malankarese claim to NOT hold this view.

2.If Christ United the human nature to the divine nature Compositely (Mia Physis), then both natures exist as a single unity, but without mixture, division, change or separation. THis is far closer to the orthodox position, because it admits no change in each nature, meaning that each nature would preserve the properties natural to it and act as a unified whole in the person of Christ, Emmanuel. BUT the problem remains that this is still spoken of as a union with the DIVINE NATURE which is simply not particular to Christ, but is common to the trinity (The Divine Nature). Therefore each member would be Personally Distinct, but Have the same Mia Physis as Christ! They would all be Compositely united to the flesh! To Say he united it to HIS Divine NAture, but not the others results in Di-Theistic-Binitarianism. If The son has a divine nature apart from the Father, he is a second God. Those who would claim this must be thinking of the next answer intuitively:

3. THe Third option without resorting to Nestorianism is Pope St. Leo's Formula of Christ being both FROM Two distinct natures, and IN Two distinct natures, BUT this does not compromise the unity for they are both inseparably joined together de facto by sharing a common point of Union: THe Person of The Word. And they are not confused in Him for they are not united to the divine nature in General, but to the Person who has a divine nature. The Word takes the whole substance of man and makes it his own while retaining the whole substance of his divinity.

Probably a poor metaphor, but one I could think of right off the top of my head is A Man With one head and two Bodies, One Divine, One Human, but it is the one and the same person who is both; NOt two sons, NOt one Nature. One son OF and IN two natures: The Natures inseparably united in the prosopon, hypostasis of the Word. THe Natures indivisibly distinct from each other, The union of both natures being made secondarily in the PERSON, The Subsistence that is the Word apart from the Father and the Spirit.

HOWEVER:
a. Is it right to divide the simple trinity into Person and Nature? Can each Subsistence be cast into two parts? Does the Person who is the word distinguish himself from his nature? Here we get into Aquinas's definition (and a horribly meager one) of persons within the trinity: Internal relationships of essences. Hence he defends the simplicity of the nature, but not distinguishing the persons, makes room for the filioque: For the Essence of the Spirit IS of the Father and the Son, But the SOn's Essence is also of the Father and the Spirit, and the Fathers essence of the SPirit and the Son, THe Divine Essence is Common and interpenetrating; but the Persons are of distinct and different origin: The Father alone. So the question is:

1. What Christological Definition best describes the relationship of Natures in Christ while AVOIDING the Eutychian Consequence of a Trinitarian Incarnation?

2. Can Mia Physis Avoid the problem of An ultimately Trinitarian INcarnation?

[Vasiliki D.]

Hi Daniel,

I know Saint John of Damascus uses an example of tempering iron (humanity) with fire (divinity) ... if someone can offer a reference to that?

[Christopher Dombrowski]

Let me establish the main underlying point behind everything I'm going to say following. The main problem in your understanding the Alexandrine Christology is in seeing "physis" as simply and only meaning "common substance". Hopefully I'll be able to explain how the Miaphysitism of Cyril of Alexandria can make sense if we come to another understanding of what "physis" can mean.

"Is it really valid to say that a union of natures in ANY sense was made?"

Given what I'm guessing is your understanding of the term "physis", the answer is actually no. We cannot admit to a "making one" of the human and divine substances in Christ. Such a thing would other suggest an overwhelming of the humanity by the divinity or perhaps even the creation of a third thing by their melding. And such Christology is the type of Monophysitism that the Chalcedonians and even the Non-Chalcedonians have both condemned. If we understand "physis" to mean more so "mode of being", however, it is valid to say that a union of natures was made. Christ is one theandric being who unites humanity and divinity as one way of being in Himself, though they maintain their distinction according to substance, as Saint Cyril taught.

"Since the divine nature is not proper to CHrist alone, it is tantamount to saying that all three persons of the blessed trinity have taken on the nature of Christ's Humanity. This would be why Peter the Fuller ADDED "...who was crucified for us..." to the trisagion."

I don't agree that this is why Peter added "who was crucified for us". While it is true that the Constantinopolitan church and those churches derived from it have traditionally interpreted the Trisagion to be a Trinitarian hymn, it is equally evident that the Alexandrian (Coptic) and Antiochene (Assyrian) churches have traditionally interpreted the Trisagion hymn to be a Christological hymn. For Peter to add that phrase would thus be for him to say that God the Word was crucified for us, not that all three persons of the Trinity were crucified for us.

"BUT the problem remains that this is still spoken of as a union with the DIVINE NATURE which is simply not particular to Christ, but is common to the trinity (The Divine Nature)."

This is not what Cyril or the Non-Chalcedonians meant by nature. As a matter of fact, to define "physis" as synonymous with "ousia" was a rather late development, only explicitly showing up in Church tradition at the Second Council of Constantinople in 553. Beforehand, numerous Fathers within the Church had confessed that they understood "physis" to be synonymous with "hypostasis". Thus when Cyril and the Non-Chalcedonians confess "mia physis" they are confessing that the individuated divine being, God the Word, was made one in being with the individuated humanity that He took from Mary, a humanity that never existed outside of union with the Word. Even that they go out of the way to specify that the human nature of Jesus did not exist before the union should indicate that to them, in the realm of Christology, nature is understood to be that which is particular rather than that which is common.

"Therefore each member would be Personally Distinct, but Have the same Mia Physis as Christ!"

The mia physis is the divine being of God the Word being made one theandric being at the Incarnation. There is no suggestion in the Cyrilline tradition of the divine nature common to the three persons of the Trinity being made one with the humanity of Christ. Cyril and the Non-Chalcedonians have never understood the Father and the Holy Spirit to share the Mia physis. Neither do they partake of our human substance nor do they even subsist in the theandric mode of being that the Incarnate Word subsists in after the Incarnation. The Father and the Holy Spirit remain entirely non-human, participating in humanity only in so far as perichoresis demands.

"To Say he united it to HIS Divine NAture, but not the others results in Di-Theistic-Binitarianism. If The son has a divine nature apart from the Father, he is a second God."

In so far as nature is being used to mean hypostasis (subsistence or being), yes, the Son certainly does have an individuated nature distinct from (but of the same substance with) the hypostasis of the Father.

"without resorting to Nestorianism is Pope St. Leo's Formula"

Theodoret of Cyrus, Ibas of Edessa, and Nestorius all proclaimed the Tome of Leo as confessing precisely what they had all taught all along. What makes you think resorting to the Tome is not resorting to Nestorianism?

"and IN Two distinct natures"

How is Christ in two natures? Are you suggesting He is in two modes of being? That's Nestorianism. Are you suggesting He's in two abstract substances? How is that possible?

"Is it right to divide the simple trinity into Person and Nature?"

To distinguish between ousia and hypostasis in the Trinity? This is Holy Tradition.

"Does the Person who is the word distinguish himself from his nature?"

Not in the view of the hardcore Cyrillines. His nature is equivalent to His being and this is why He is understood to be one theandric nature.

"What Christological Definition best describes the relationship of Natures in Christ while AVOIDING the Eutychian Consequence of a Trinitarian Incarnation?"

I personally think it is confessing that "Christ is one nature of God the Word Incarnate who is from two natures even after the union". This is a combination of two core Cyrilline formulas.

[Ryan]

Saint Cyril's phrase "one nature of the Word Incarnate" is in fact Orthodox and capable of Orthodox interpretation, notwithstanding the heretical positions that were later justified using this expression. The Orthodox interpretation is explained by St. John Damascene in his Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith (http://www.orthodox.net/fathers/exactiii.html#BOOK_III_CHAPTER_XI).

While the non-Chalcedonians maintain that they believe the union to be unconfused and without change, I believe this is undermined by the fact that they do not allow for any actual distinction between the natures, and thus they maintain that Pope Saint Leo is a heretic. Moreover, while they deny monophysitism, they had no issue with monoenergism and monothelitism, which were proposed as a means of reconciling the non-Chalcedonians to the Church. The only issue seems to be that these heresies did not go far enough. Moreover, a frequent analogy made by the non-Chalcedonians is that, just like a child is not in his two mother and father but of them, so was Christ not in two natures but of them, which seems to me to indicate change, mixture, and confusion.

[Ryan]

Some more little points...



Theodoret of Cyrus, Ibas of Edessa, and Nestorius all proclaimed the Tome of Leo as confessing precisely what they had all taught all along. What makes you think resorting to the Tome is not resorting to Nestorianism?

Well, because the Tome itself is not Nestorian. Similarly, Eutyches claimed to be a follower of Cyril, but this doesn't make Cyril a monophysite.


How is Christ in two natures? Are you suggesting He is in two modes of being? That's Nestorianism. Are you suggesting He's in two abstract substances? How is that possible?

The natures are neither different beings nor abstract substances. They are united in one hypostasis or "person". For example, you and I have a common human nature, but that does not make us the same person. So the concepts of hypostasis and nature must remain distinct, which makes your formula ("one nature... from two natures after the union") untenable. Christ is still IN two natures because, if they become one compound nature, then one cannot say that He is of those natures after the union. The natures would have blended together into something else.

St. John Damascene says:

"For the two natures were united with each other without change or alteration, neither the divine nature departing from its native simplicity, nor yet the human being either changed into the nature of God or reduced to non-existence, nor one compound nature being produced out of the two. For the compound nature cannot be of the same essence as either of the natures out of which it is compounded, as made one thing out of others: for example, the body is composed of the four elements, but is not of the same essence as fire or air, or water or earth, nor does it keep these names. If, therefore, after the union, Christ's nature was, as the heretics hold, a compound unity, He had changed from a simple into a compound nature, and is not of the same essence as the Father Whose nature is simple, nor as the mother, who is not a compound of divinity and humanity. Nor will He then be in divinity and humanity: nor will He be called either God or Man, but simply Christ: and the word Christ will be the name not of the subsistence, but of what in their view is the one nature. "

[Christopher Dombrowski]

While the non-Chalcedonians maintain that they believe the union to be unconfused and without change, I believe this is undermined by the fact that they do not allow for any actual distinction between the natures,

This is not true. Cyril introduced the formula "from two natures" in his Formula of Reunion with John of Antioch. In this Formula he specified that the distinction of the natures did not cease. The Non-Chalcedonians hold to this. Further, the home synod of Constantinople of 448 (which was the council that originally condemned Eutyches) used the formula "from two natures after the union". Pope Dioscorus I himself admitted to the orthodoxy of this formula. The formula obviously conserves the distinction of the natures, because for Christ to be composed form two natures not just as a result of the union, but even after the union, it requires that there are still two natures for Him to be composed of. On top of this, when the Chalcedonian church specified that the natures are distinct only with respect to substance and not being, the Non-Chalcedonians generally received this emphasis. Therefore, I think it's quite clear that it is untrue that they do not allow for any distinction between the humanity and divinity after the union.


and thus they maintain that Pope Saint Leo is a heretic.

They condemn Pope Leo for much more substantial reasons than this. First and least substantially was the he seemed to be an early adherent of the erroneous views of papal supremacy and infallibility. Second, and more substantially was that even after Theodoret of Cyrus was condemned as a Nestorian by the Second Council of Ephesus, Leo restored him to communion and episcopal dignity even before the Council of Chalcedon got a chance to convene. Third, his legates along with some others at Chalcedon officially restored Ibas of Edessa on the basis of his letter to Maris, a document that was later condemned by the Chalcedonian body itself at the Second Council of Constantinople. Finally, because he had written in his tome that in Christ "each form does the acts which belong to it, in communion with the other. The Word, that is, performing what is proper to the Word, and the flesh performing what is proper to the flesh; one of these shines out in miracles, while one succumbs to injuries". This passage from the Tome essentially sets up the union to be a conjunct communion of two subjects, rather than the actual Cyrilline conception of one divine subject made flesh who performs both human and divine things Himself. In light of this, when Leo confesses Christ to be "in two natures", it does not appear that He is indicating one being present in two substances, but rather one personality present in two beings.


Moreover, while they deny monophysitism, they had no issue with monoenergism and monothelitism, which were proposed as a means of reconciling the non-Chalcedonians to the Church.

What the Non-Chalcedonians deny is Apollinarianism, Eutychianism, and Julianism. If by "mono physis" we mean one theandric nature and by "mono energeia" we mean one theandric power and by "mono thelos" we mean one theandric will, the Non-Chalcedonians would admit to all of these being orthodox.


Moreover, a frequent analogy made by the non-Chalcedonians is that, just like a child is not in his two mother and father but of them, so was Christ not in two natures but of them, which seems to me to indicate change, mixture, and confusion.

It didn't to Cyril of Alexandria. He himself accepted "from two natures" and rejected "in two natures".

[Ryan]

This is not true. Cyril introduced the formula "from two natures" in his Formula of Reunion with John of Antioch. In this Formula he specified that the distinction of the natures did not cease.The Non-Chalcedonians hold to this.

I see the non-Chalcedonians saying that the distinction remains, but I do not see any explanation as to how, since they do not accept two wills or two energies, or the understanding that Christ, as a single subject, can perform distinct actions according to his human or divine natures.

Now, St. Cyril's terminology was a bit imprecise (it's not easy to talk about this stuff in words). He used the terms "nature" and "hypostasis" interchangeably, but his main concern was to drive home the understanding that Christ was not in two hypostases (or "natures") but one. Chalcedon was a positive development from Cyril because it introduced a distinction between the terms "hypostasis" and "nature." By maintaining that Christ was in one hypostasis, it upheld Cyril's formula "One nature (or hypostasis) of God the Word Incarnate." At the same time, it also gave expression to the distinctions between Christ's humanity and divinity, with the term "nature", so as to clearly refute any notion that the two natures were mixed together or that one was absorbed into the other.

If the non-Chalcedonians are willing to accept a distinction between the natures after the union, then there should be no problem with the phrase "in two natures" since the two natures continue to exist distinct from one another.

The problem with the formula "Christ is one nature of God the Word Incarnate who is from two natures even after the union" is that it uses the same word ("nature") to refer to two different things. Otherwise it is nonsensical to say "one nature... from two natures even after the union." It is more precise to say "one hypostasis in two natures."


Finally, because he had written in his tome that in Christ "each form does the acts which belong to it, in communion with the other. The Word, that is, performing what is proper to the Word, and the flesh performing what is proper to the flesh; one of these shines out in miracles, while one succumbs to injuries"

Throughout the Tome, Leo maintains the oneness of Christ as a person, a single subject: 'So it is on account of this oneness of the person, which must be understood in both natures, that we both read that the son of man came down from heaven, when the Son of God took flesh from the virgin from whom he was born, and again that the Son of God is said to have been crucified and buried, since he suffered these things not in the divinity itself whereby the Only-begotten is co-eternal and consubstantial with the Father, but in the weakness of the human nature. That is why in the creed, too, we all confess that the only-begotten Son of God was crucified and was buried, following what the apostle said, "If they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of majesty."'

If Leo had meant a "conjunct communion of two subjects," he would not be able to say that the only-begotten Son of God was crucified, a notion that the Nestorians firmly rejected. It was, of course, Christ's human nature that suffered and died on the cross, and not the divine nature- nevertheless, owing to the hypostatic union, we can say the Son of God suffered and died. Cyril said the same thing when he said "the Word of God suffered in the flesh"- here he is showing that the humanity of Christ ("the flesh") does something that the divinity does not- nevertheless, it happens to the Word of God because of the hypostatic union.

St. Cyril approves very similar language to Leo's in his Letter to John of Antioch:

"According to this understanding of this unmixed union, we confess the holy Virgin to be Mother of God; because God the Word was incarnate and became Man, and from this conception he united the temple taken from her with himself.

"For we know the theologians make some things of the Evangelical and Apostolic teaching about the Lord common as pertaining to the one person, and other things they divide as to the two natures, and attribute the worthy ones to God on account of the Divinity of Christ, and the lowly ones on account of his humanity [to his humanity].

"These being your holy voices, and finding ourselves thinking the same with them (“One Lord, One Faith, One Baptism,”) we glorified God the Saviour of all, congratulating one another that our churches and yours have the Faith which agrees with the God-inspired Scriptures and the traditions of our holy Fathers."



What the Non-Chalcedonians deny is Apollinarianism, Eutychianism, and Julianism. If by "mono physis" we mean one theandric nature and by "mono energeia" we mean one theandric power and by "mono thelos" we mean one theandric will, the Non-Chalcedonians would admit to all of these being orthodox.

If Christ cannot have two natures, two energies, and two wills, operating harmoniously in the same hypostasis, then how is distinction maintained between the natures?

While we're on the subject, I would like to mention that, as you probably know, the heresies of monoenergism and monothelitism were formulated with the purpose of reconciling the non-Chalcedonians, and this was in fact accomplished. The Armenian and Coptic churches accepted a "Pact of Union" with Patriarch Sergius in the 630's which affirmed monoenergism. So it would appear that monoenergism and monothelitism are positions of the non-Chalcedonian churches.


It didn't to Cyril of Alexandria. He himself accepted "from two natures" and rejected "in two natures".

This is because the terms "nature" and "hypostasis" were interchangeable for him. In Chalcedonian terminology, he was rejecting the idea of two hypostases. This is not what St. Leo or the Council of Chalcedon taught.

[Daniel Smith]

First of all, we addressed the fact that it is patristically correct to distinguish between Substance/essence and person in the Godhead. Ok, I believe that.

BUt now you are saying that there is a problem with accepting the fact that Christ is in IN two natures. This does not mean that the person of Christ subsists in two different Modes: Human and Divine. It MEANS That the one directing his energies is his PERSON.

A nature has no power to react or intiate change. Only a person can direct his nature. Now, you say that Christ is one theandric nature. I can accept that Christ's Natures are a unity held in composition, But this Unity is not a mere COnjoinging of Natures as SUCH. The UNITY of the natures Is in the Point where they merge into true unmixed conjunction: That point is The Divine Person of the Word. One Theandric Nature there may be, but this composite nature does not Direct itself, Christ, the incarnate Word, The Individually subsistent Part of the second person of the Godhead is the Person who is IN the Divine nature and IN the human nature inasmuch as he has taken the HUman nature unto himSELF, The Divine EGO of The WORD.

Consequently he performs all actions that are human as a Divine Person Doing Human things and Divine things. While the operations are distinct, they are not separate since they are Done by One Word. There are two wills that Are In Christ: But he is not at odds with himself, because he wills both as a single Person. There is no duality in Personhood, and THAT is why Leo is not Nestorian.

[Daniel Smith]

DOn't misunderstand, I am very sympathetic towards the orientals, especially the ethiopians, I DO believe Mia Physis is an o/Orthodox expression, Correct EO's? BUt I DO believe The Independently Subsistent Word is the Center of activity for both natures, and therefore the union must be Hypostatic one, NOt a composite natural one in itself for its own sake. The center of Activity must be the person, because as I have stated, it is not the human and divine that will and work, but he who is wielder of their independent natures. Christ Died as Man. But he is a Divine Person who died, not a nature, and therefore, "He who is God Died." It is necessary for our salvation; and yet The Divine Word has a human will, a human emotion, a rational soul, and a human energy. THis is so because he has made them HIS. The Word Subsists IN the Human Nature, not in the sense of displaced possesion, but in the sense of real Hypostatic Union with the flesh and its faculties. All activities are attributed to one Person, One Christ,but not all activities have their origin in the same nature. But the communication of idioms extends across all of Christs actions: A Divine Person Hungered. A Divine Person was murdered. A Divine Person Raised the Dead. A divine Person sought solitude and companionship. God was born. Man did not become God (Nestorius), but in Christ IS God, through association with his person, and through his person his Nature. Person is the Bridge by which union is effected.

Moreover the example given by the non-chalcedonians about a Child not being IN Father and MOther COmpletely misses the point of the demonstration. First of all, the child in said example is not coming into existence to hold two disimilar natures in a willful union in himself. He is a product of the natural union man and woman. His existence is dependent on both equally. Of course he is not IN both because he does not seek to hold the union of Mother and Father in himself, thus creating a tri-parsopic/hypostatic entity. He merely exists as the combined product of a natural cause. Materially speaking. Christ exceeds this example. Christ is not personally OF the Divine Nature, He is OF the Father, eternally begotten. His Divine nature IS of the same nature as the trinity, because the Nature of the Person from whom he is begotten is divine. Likewise, Christ is not OF the Panagias nature, but he is the one who has united the flesh taken from her to his person so that he subsists as truly in the flesh as he subsists in his divinity. And it is one Subsisten Person who exists, not two.

Thus this frail example pales in comparison to the real mystery present: ONe Person is simultaneously Divine and Human: And He has made The Human Nature as proper to himSELF as the Divine is.

[Christopher Dombrowski]

I see the non-Chalcedonians saying that the distinction remains, but I do not see any explanation as to how, since they do not accept two wills or two energies, or the understanding that Christ, as a single subject, can perform distinct actions according to his human or divine natures.

The Non-Chalcedonians have made it quite clear that the remaining of distinction is in composition. The essence or substance of Christ's humanity retains the very same essence and substance of our own humanity and the essence/substance of Christ's divinity retains the very same as what He had before the union.

The denial of the reality of two wills or energies is relative. I suggest reading "The Nature of Christ" by Pope Shenouda III. He indicates that while the will and energy in Christ is one according to being because it centers in and manifests from one being, that nonetheless, His will and energy is theandric, being dual in composition. That the Incarnate Word performs distinct action derived sometimes from His divinity and sometimes from His humanity is found right in the Formula of Reunion, and numerous Non-Chalcedonian theologians have re-affirmed it throughout history.




Now, St. Cyril's terminology was a bit imprecise (it's not easy to talk about this stuff in words). He used the terms "nature" and "hypostasis" interchangeably, but his main concern was to drive home the understanding that Christ was not in two hypostases (or "natures") but one.

And given this equivication, his rejection of "in two natures" can be recognized and understood.




Chalcedon was a positive development from Cyril because it introduced a distinction between the terms "hypostasis" and "nature." By maintaining that Christ was in one hypostasis, it upheld Cyril's formula "One nature (or hypostasis) of God the Word Incarnate." At the same time, it also gave expression to the distinctions between Christ's humanity and divinity, with the term "nature", so as to clearly refute any notion that the two natures were mixed together or that one was absorbed into the other.

But the real question is whether it continued to protect against Nestorianism fully as it did this.

While I certainly will admit that by confessing that Christ is "one hypostasis" who is "in two natures", the Council of Chalcedon drew a substantial distinction between the terms hypostasis and physis, what exactly was their definition of these terms was unclear. Now many Chalcedonians regard the definition of Chalcedon as meaning "in two ousia". But if you really examine the acts of the Ecumenical Councils, you may come to realize that this was not the state of the synodical definitions. As of the First Council of Ephesus, physis was an equivication of hypostasis. When Chalcedon drew up "in two natures", they did not specify that they meant anything different from the term than Cyril had. The definition of physis to mean ousia did not actually appear until the Second Council of Constantinople. So how can we be sure that the Council of Chalcedon was not suggesting "in two hypostases"? Perhaps because beforehand it confesses "one hypostasis"? Yet there is a famous report that when the Nestorians asked what they meant by "hypostasis", that the bishops respond that it was equivalent to "prosopon". And given also the reality that the Tome never used the term hypostasis, but only prosopon, it really isn't quite clear exactly what the "in two natures" was referring to at the time.




If the non-Chalcedonians are willing to accept a distinction between the natures after the union, then there should be no problem with the phrase "in two natures" since the two natures continue to exist distinct from one another.

There should be no problem? That makes no sense. Remember Cyril of Alexandria! He confessed that Christ is "from two natures" and that the "distinction of the natures is not taken away". And even given this reality he still would not yield to "in two natures". Why then do you expect the Non-Chalcedonians to do so? What makes you think they don't have the exact same issues with it as Cyril?

I even see this myself and I have an intellectual resistance to "in two natures". The phrase seems to suggest more than composition. "Christ is in two natures"? This seems to suggest a divided twoness of being to me. I can sympathize with admitting that the humanity and divinity remain distinct according to composition but resisting "in two natures".




The problem with the formula "Christ is one nature of God the Word Incarnate who is from two natures even after the union" is that it uses the same word ("nature") to refer to two different things. Otherwise it is nonsensical to say "one nature... from two natures even after the union."

How so? Remember that Cyril attached the phrase "en theoria" to his confession of from two natures. Why did he do this? It was another protection against Nestorianism. How did it protect against Nestorianism? This makes sense given that Cyril did not give up his equivication of hypostasis and physis even then. He really was saying "from two hypostases". With no qualification it would have sounded Nestorian. But Cyril was more careful than that. He made the point that the individuated divinity and the individuated humanity are two beings only in our theorizing about them. In actuality, there never was a time when the humanity of Christ was a distinct being from the Word, and that there was never a time that it existed outside of the hypostatic union. Thus, we do admit that Christ is "from two beings" but that this definition is only theoretical. Otherwise, with respect to reality, Christ is only one theandric hypostasis of God the Word Incarnate.




It is more precise to say "one hypostasis in two natures."

I keep asking this question to confessors of "in two natures" over and over again. It's not that I expect you can't answer it. You may very well be the one person I now talk to who has a legitimate answer. But so far no one I have talked to has had a legitimate answer. What do you mean by "nature" when you say "in two natures"? There are two possible meanings that I can see, depending on whether you abide by the Cyrilline definition of nature or the Justinian (meaning from the Second Council of Constantinople) definition of nature. If the former, that "nature" is being, then how is it not Nestorian to confess that Christ is "in two natures"? I doubt that that is how you define nature. But I see a problem with it in the Justinian definition as well. Allow me to quote the 7th Christological anathema of the Second Council of Constantinople:

" If anyone using the expression, “in two natures,” does not confess that our one Lord Jesus Christ has been revealed in the divinity and in the humanity, so as to designate by that expression a difference of the natures of which an ineffable union is unconfusedly made, [a union] in which neither the nature of the Word was changed into that of the flesh, nor that of the flesh into that of the Word, for each remained that it was by nature, the union being hypostatic; but shall take the expression with regard to the mystery of Christ in a sense so as to divide the parties, or recognising the two natures in the only Lord Jesus, God the Word made man, does not content himself with taking in a theoretical manner the difference of the natures which compose him, which difference is not destroyed by the union between them, for one is composed of the two and the two are in one, but shall make use of the number [two] to divide the natures or to make of them Persons properly so called: let him be anathema."

The notes right after the bold read "I.e. “as an abstraction (τῇ θεωρίᾳ μόνῃ).”". If the difference of the natures is thus understood to be simply in a theoretical manner and they are taken as two natures as abstractions, then I must wonder how could Christ possibly be in them as two natures? On one hand, the concrete being of the humanity and divinity are derived from two real and distinct individuations, yet they are united as one being, then we cannot understand Christ to be "in two natures" on that level. If, on the other hand, the term nature is equivicated with ousia but the twoness of them is still admitted to be merely theoretical and an abstraction, how can Christ be in two abstractions? How can He be in abstractions at all? Would it not be more appropriate to admit that the only thing that a person can be in are concrete and existential realities, and that on this level Christ's humanity and divinity are made one?




Throughout the Tome, Leo maintains the oneness of Christ as a person, a single subject: 'So it is on account of this oneness of the person, which must be understood in both natures, that we both read that the son of man came down from heaven, when the Son of God took flesh from the virgin from whom he was born, and again that the Son of God is said to have been crucified and buried, since he suffered these things not in the divinity itself whereby the Only-begotten is co-eternal and consubstantial with the Father, but in the weakness of the human nature. That is why in the creed, too, we all confess that the only-begotten Son of God was crucified and was buried, following what the apostle said, "If they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of majesty."'

If Leo had meant a "conjunct communion of two subjects," he would not be able to say that the only-begotten Son of God was crucified, a notion that the Nestorians firmly rejected.

Actually, the Nestorians resisted the accusation that they had divided Christ into two Sons. They admitted only one Son. They confessed a propopic union, a union of prosopon. By this they meant that two distinct beings (hypostases) had become the possession of one person known as Christ. This is why they would confess Christotokos but not Theotokos. Likewise, I am confident that they may have been willing to admit that the one Son was crucified, while the Logos was not. This is not much unlike the Tome. For as I previously mentioned, he writes that the Word performs what is proper to the Word and the Flesh performs what is proper to the Flesh. "The Word" was a very traditional and contemporary phrase to indicate the second hypostasis of the Trinity. Thus, the Tome seems moreso to indicate to me that Leo thought that there were two beings in Christ distinctly performing two different manner of things united as "one person", not unlike the Nestorians had confessed. "Son of God" may very well have been a synonym for "Christ".




It was, of course, Christ's human nature that suffered and died on the cross,

An abstract substance cannot suffer. It was the Incarnate Word who suffered.




Cyril said the same thing when he said "the Word of God suffered in the flesh"- here he is showing that the humanity of Christ ("the flesh") does something that the divinity does not

He is not saying that at all. He is saying that the Word of God because of His humanity is doing something that He would not simply because of His divinity. The flesh does nothing as if a distinct being. The divinity does nothing as if a distinct being. The Incarnate Word does both human and divine things because of His humanity and divinity.




If Christ cannot have two natures, two energies, and two wills, operating harmoniously in the same hypostasis, then how is distinction maintained between the natures?

There are not two things operating in the same "hypostasis". Operation can only happen from a hypostasis. Therefore there is only one thing operating in Christ, and that is the Incarnate Word.

We may divine nature, will, and energy in Christ as if two with respect to theory and abstraction. On this level there are two natures in Christ according to substance, two wills according to substance, and two energies according to substance. However, the Alexandrine tradition (and thus the Non-Chalcedonians) generally try to avoid of thinking of what may be theoretically true about Christ and rather sticking to what is actually true about Christ's concrete reality. In this reality, Christ does not exist as two in nature, being human on one hand and divine on the other. He exists as one hollistic and united theandric being according to nature. Christ does not desire to act as a human on one hand and as God on the other. His desire is hollistic and united, and thus He has one theandric will. He does not have a drive to act as a human on one hand and as God on the other. His power or drive is hollistic and united and thus He has one theandric energy.




While we're on the subject, I would like to mention that, as you probably know, the heresies of monoenergism and monothelitism were formulated with the purpose of reconciling the non-Chalcedonians, and this was in fact accomplished. The Armenian and Coptic churches accepted a "Pact of Union" with Patriarch Sergius in the 630's which affirmed monoenergism. So it would appear that monoenergism and monothelitism are positions of the non-Chalcedonian churches.

I think in the realm of these terminologies it should be evident by now that we cannot simply through around the term "heretic" on the basis of formulas. If there is a heretical substance behind those formulas, then their adherents are heretics. If the formulas are associated with certain heresies but their adherents actually claim an orthodox substance to them, those adherents cannot be viewed as heretics. Accordingly, we cannot jump to label the Non-Chalcedonians heretics simply because they claim "one nature" and "one will" and "one 'energeia'". The Councils themselves admit and make clear that there are numerous different meanings to these words. 2nd Constantinople points this out also with "union". The Apollinarians, Eutychians, and Nestorians all also confessed a "personal union". But that does not necessarily mean that they meant something orthodox by it.

As to the Third Council of Constantinople, in reading the acts of it, there appears to be three different forms of monothelitism/monoenergism addressed and condemned there. First is the Eutychian idea that the human ousia is dissolved into the divine ousia and thus there is only a divine will to go along with it. Second is the idea that the humanity and divinity become united on the level of ousia and form a third "theandric" ousia and that the will of Christ is according to this third ousia. Finally, is the idea that the humanity of Christ was subsumed into the hypostastis of the Word and that thus the humanity loses its natural properties.

While it is true that the Non-Chalcedonians subscribe to a form of monophysitism, a form of monothelitism, and a form of monoenergism, it is clear to me that the form they subscribe to me is not any of the above three. Rather, the Non-Chalcedonians appear to speak of the humanity and divinity remain distinct according to ousia and thus retaining all their properties. Where the monothelitism comes in is because of the communicatio idiomatum. All properites of the divine and human substances of Christ are communicated to His theandric hypostasis because He as the theandric hypostasis completely owns, possesses, and subsists in His humanity and divinity. According to existential, concrete reality, these properites become entirely His own, and thus they only manifest as His own, according to His being. The Monothelitism of the Non-Chalcedonians is thus admitting that the will of Christ is two according to substance, yet hypostatically one according to its manifestation in being. I have absolutely no problem with this form of Monothelitism and do not regard it as a heresy condemned by the EO Tradition. As a matter of fact, it is easily more orthodox than trying to say somehow that the humanity and divinity continue to desire and enact the things proper to them in distinction from each other, even after the hypostatic union.

I hope this helps.
-Cyril

[Christopher Dombrowski]

Well, because the Tome itself is not Nestorian.

Why are you so sure of that?




Similarly, Eutyches claimed to be a follower of Cyril, but this doesn't make Cyril a monophysite.

No. Cyril's own confession of one nature makes him a Monophysite. Cyril is prime and most famous of Monophysites. Eutyches was just an uneducated fool who perverted the teachings of Cyril and also of Dioscorus.




The natures are neither different beings nor abstract substances.

This is not what the Second Council of Constantinople teaches. It explicitly teaches the latter.

But I am no terminological Nazi. What would you understand nature to be, then?




They are united in one hypostasis or "person".

Given the Nestorian teaching of a "prosopic union" and prosopon's translation to persona in Latin, I think it would preserve orthodoxy better to translate hypostasis as "being" rather than the more ambiguous term "person".




For example, you and I have a common human nature, but that does not make us the same person. So the concepts of hypostasis and nature must remain distinct, which makes your formula ("one nature... from two natures after the union") untenable.

You're using an understanding of nature that was only proprosed by the Chalcedonian churches 500 years after the Apostolic Council of Jerusalem. You cannot simply say "this is what nature means and I'm going to hold everyone else to this definition even if that's not what they even mean by it". If you understand that the early Church used nature as synonymous with hypostasis then "one nature of God the Word Incarnate" coupled with "from two natures (en theoria) in and after the union" make perfect sense. If you insist that nature must mean ousia, then your failure to understand is really your own fault.




Christ is still IN two natures because, if they become one compound nature, then one cannot say that He is of those natures after the union. The natures would have blended together into something else.

A denial of "in two natures" does not necessarily mean the denier is speaking of a confusion of the two ousia, as I have already shown.




St. John Damascene says:

"For the two natures were united with each other without change or alteration, neither the divine nature departing from its native simplicity, nor yet the human being either changed into the nature of God or reduced to non-existence, nor one compound nature being produced out of the two. For the compound nature cannot be of the same essence as either of the natures out of which it is compounded, as made one thing out of others: for example, the body is composed of the four elements, but is not of the same essence as fire or air, or water or earth, nor does it keep these names. If, therefore, after the union, Christ's nature was, as the heretics hold, a compound unity, He had changed from a simple into a compound nature, and is not of the same essence as the Father Whose nature is simple, nor as the mother, who is not a compound of divinity and humanity. Nor will He then be in divinity and humanity: nor will He be called either God or Man, but simply Christ: and the word Christ will be the name not of the subsistence, but of what in their view is the one nature. "

All of this makes sense when nature is understood to mean ousia, but on the other hand does not exclude the legitimate differences that arise when nature is understood to mean hypostasis.

[Christopher Dombrowski]

First of all, we addressed the fact that it is patristically correct to distinguish between Substance/essence and person in the Godhead. Ok, I believe that.

As of the 360 council of Alexandria and the 381 council of Constantinople, sure. However, if you read the original Nicene Creed (of 325), you will notice that it anathematizes those who would suggest that the Logos is of a different hypostasis from the Father. Speaking of three hypostases of one ousia is a legitimate, though obviously later development.




But now you are saying that there is a problem with accepting the fact that Christ is in IN two natures.

Not necessarily. I'm open to the possibility that there is a logical and orthodox understanding of it. I just haven't seen it so far. I've only seen either someone who is orthodox but doesn't really have a logical understanding of "in two natures" or someone who has a logical understanding of the phrase but is not orthodox.




This does not mean that the person of Christ subsists in two different Modes: Human and Divine. It MEANS That the one directing his energies is his PERSON.

Really? Because the former sounds like it actually corresponds to "in two natures", whereas the latter just seems like wishful thinking to me. How does "one being directs two energies" correspond to "one person in two natures"?




A nature has no power to react or intiate change.

The Justinian nature doesn't, sure. The Cyrilline nature, however is the very thing that has the power to act.




Now, you say that Christ is one theandric nature.

And, as I have said, this means that Christ is one theandric being, not that He is composed of one theandric substance.




I can accept that Christ's Natures are a unity held in composition, But this Unity is not a mere COnjoinging of Natures as SUCH. The UNITY of the natures Is in the Point where they merge into true unmixed conjunction: That point is The Divine Person of the Word.

I don't even consider the indwelling itself to be a nature (other than perhaps as the mode in which Christ exists). The composite "nature" I am speaking of is the Incarnate Word that you are likewise speaking of.




One Theandric Nature there may be, but this composite nature does not Direct itself, Christ, the incarnate Word, The Individually subsistent Part of the second person of the Godhead is the Person who is IN the Divine nature and IN the human nature inasmuch as he has taken the HUman nature unto himSELF, The Divine EGO of The WORD.

That is precisely the theandric nature I am speaking of, the theandric being of Christ known as the Word Incarnate.




Consequently he performs all actions that are human as a Divine Person Doing Human things and Divine things.

While I agree that it is the Word who performs the divine and human things (that the Tome says otherwise is why I object to it), I do not understand why you refer to the Word as an exclusively divine person...




While the operations are distinct, they are not separate since they are Done by One Word. There are two wills that Are In Christ: But he is not at odds with himself, because he wills both as a single Person.

As a single being I would say. What you are saying is orthodox. I do agree that the operations and wills are distinct according to their substance. When I insist on referring to them as one is in reference to the concrete existence with respect to the Incarnate Word.




There is no duality in Personhood, and THAT is why Leo is not Nestorian.

Leo never confessed one hypostasis in Christ. He confessed one prosopon. So did the Nestorians. That on top of this he says that the Word performs things divine while the Flesh performs things fleshly is thus what brings into question whether Leo actually believed that Christ was one hypostasis, or perhaps he believed that Christ was one prosopon subsisting in two hypostases.

[Daniel Smith]

Wow. I agree with you mostly. I recognize terminology is sticky business. Let me introduce terms as I see useful, and you can tell me if my meaning is vague: the word of god, Christ, is a person who is solely divine, that is to say the ego of Christ, the timeless individual subsisting person, before the union. He, the divine logos, consents to be incarnate. This means that he takes flesh from the virgin, and united it to himself. Therefore he is of the divine father and truly divine, and of the theotokos and truly man. He is in the divine nature, in that the logos is from, and remains divine, and in the human nature in that the logos enfleshed is from and remains human. He is subsistently both simultaneously. Hypostaticaly. Now, those maintaining that hypostasis is synonymous with physis will RIGHTLY speak of one incarnate Nature of the word "without division, change, mingling or separation." Yet those who speak of one incarnate PERSON who is the Word speak truly: both denounce nestorius and eutyches. However the chalcedonian, in speaking of person is setting up a single point of reference for the union. When orientals speak of the union, it is hard for me, because I do not see how this union is to be spoken of: are the natures abstractly united to each other? Where is the person willing and operating? Natures don't function on their own, persons act according to their nature. Oh!!!!! I think I just hit it!! Persons act according to their nature! If Christ acts in two distinctly SEPARATE ways, it implies two persons! So there would be one theandric nature that is not confused or separated that one person acts in accordance with?

The very terminology is deceptive though and leads one to think more of fusion than union...

Is this the distinction then? That a person and their nature inseparable on oriental thinking because a person always behaves according tovhis nature?

[Ryan]

For anyone interested, the book that Christopher mentioned by Pope Shenouda III is available online here (http://www.copticchurch.net/topics/theology/nature_of_christ.pdf). It is short and to the point.


The Non-Chalcedonians have made it quite clear that the remaining of distinction is in composition. The essence or substance of Christ's humanity retains the very same essence and substance of our own humanity and the essence/substance of Christ's divinity retains the very same as what He had before the union.

If the distinction remains in place, then there are still two natures. So I cannot understand the difficulty of saying "in two natures".


And given this equivication, his rejection of "in two natures" can be recognized and understood.

I do recognize and understand it, but it is not applicable to Chalcedon.


So how can we be sure that the Council of Chalcedon was not suggesting "in two hypostases"? Perhaps because beforehand it confesses "one hypostasis"?

Exactly. This seems to me to make it perfectly clear, irrespective of the Tome or the Council of Ephesus. Obviously the Council did not mean to say "one hypostasis in two hypostases", a redundant and meaningless phrase.




There should be no problem? That makes no sense. Remember Cyril of Alexandria! He confessed that Christ is "from two natures" and that the "distinction of the natures is not taken away". And even given this reality he still would not yield to "in two natures". Why then do you expect the Non-Chalcedonians to do so? What makes you think they don't have the exact same issues with it as Cyril?

Because the phrase plainly meant something different, when Cyril dealt with it, from what it meant when it appeared at Chalcedon.


Thus, we do admit that Christ is "from two beings" but that this definition is only theoretical. Otherwise, with respect to reality, Christ is only one theandric hypostasis of God the Word Incarnate.

This indicates the deficiency of using terminology that does not distinguish between hypostasis and nature. The Chalcedonian distinction allows us to say, without contradiction, "one theandric hypostasis in two natures of God the Word Incarnate."



I keep asking this question to confessors of "in two natures" over and over again. It's not that I expect you can't answer it. You may very well be the one person I now talk to who has a legitimate answer. But so far no one I have talked to has had a legitimate answer. What do you mean by "nature" when you say "in two natures"? There are two possible meanings that I can see, depending on whether you abide by the Cyrilline definition of nature or the Justinian (meaning from the Second Council of Constantinople) definition of nature.

To answer your question (and I admit that I have been imprecise/ confused in my expression) I think a Chalcedonian must clearly accept what you call the "Justinian definition" regarding the distinction. Not that Cyril's definition is "wrong", but his indistinction of "hypostasis" and "physis" was an imprecision that had to be clarified. We don't need to say that there were two "real and distinct individuations" (in theory) before the union, because we do not identify the physis with the hypostasis. It is impossible for a nature, defined in this way, to exist without a hypostasis.

Now, the Second Council of Constantinople says that the difference between the natures is abstract- this is because they are united to a single hypostasis, so to conceive of their difference, we must think of them apart from hypostasis. The natures themselves however are not abstractions, because they are each united to the hypostasis. I would also say that "theoretical" does not mean "not real"- the term "theoretical" is used as a safeguard against regarding the natures as separate beings- nevertheless, the distinction between the natures is quite real.

Considering the natures themselves, John Damascene says this:
Nature is regarded either abstractly as a matter of pure thought (for it has no independent existence): or commonly in all hypostases of the same species as their bond of union, and is then spoken of as nature viewed in species: or universally as the same, but with the addition of accidents, in one hypostasis, and is spoken of as nature viewed in the individual, this being identical with nature viewed in species. God the Word Incarnate, therefore, did not assume the nature that is regarded as an abstraction in pure thought (for this is not incarnation, but only an imposture and a figment of incarnation), nor the nature viewed in species (for He did not assume all the hypostases): but the nature viewed in the individual, which is identical with that viewed in species

The phrase "one hypostasis in two natures" allows us to maintain, on the one hand, that Christ was a single subject, and on the other, that Christ could act according to one nature distinctly from the other. Thus we can say that God suffered and was buried, because the hypostasis that was crucified for us was God and man, one subject without division. At the same time, we are safeguarded from suggesting that the impassible divine nature suffered or died, because the natures are clearly distinct. I do not see how the non-Chalcedonian formulas can clearly maintain this last safeguard; rather, they trip over themselves and stray into dangerous territory in trying to explain Christ's unity as well as his distinct human and divine attributes using the same word, "nature."


Actually, the Nestorians resisted the accusation that they had divided Christ into two Sons. They admitted only one Son. They confessed a propopic union, a union of prosopon. By this they meant that two distinct beings (hypostases) had become the possession of one person known as Christ. This is why they would confess Christotokos but not Theotokos. Likewise, I am confident that they may have been willing to admit that the one Son was crucified, while the Logos was not.

No, they would not admit this, for the same reason they could not confess that Mary is Theotokos. The Logos and the only-begotten Son of God are the same. The Son of God is an eternal person of the trinity, so one cannot say the Son was crucified without saying that God was crucified. If they did not think God could be born from the Virgin, how could they accept that he had been crucified?

Leo plainly says 'we all confess that the only-begotten Son of God was crucified and was buried, following what the apostle said, "If they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of majesty."'

If Leo were Nestorian, he would not say "only-begotten Son of God", nor would he identify the crucified one as the "Lord of Majesty." Both of these plainly indicate that God was crucified, and in fact Pope Shenouda uses these same phrases to prove the one nature in The Nature of Christ, though he still misinterprets Leo.

Leo also says 'the Son of God took flesh from the virgin from whom he was born,' indicating that Mary is Theotokos, since he says that not only the flesh but the Son of God was born from the virgin.


For as I previously mentioned, he writes that the Word performs what is proper to the Word and the Flesh performs what is proper to the Flesh. "The Word" was a very traditional and contemporary phrase to indicate the second hypostasis of the Trinity. Thus, the Tome seems moreso to indicate to me that Leo thought that there were two beings in Christ distinctly performing two different manner of things united as "one person", not unlike the Nestorians had confessed. "Son of God" may very well have been a synonym for "Christ".

Let's bring back the body-soul analogy that Cyril used for the hypostatic union. If we say that the soul is immortal, and the body is not, or that the soul engages in contemplation or prayer, while the body engages the physical world, is this to say that a human being is composed of two beings? I don't think so. What Leo is saying is fully in accord with the view that Cyril cites (approvingly) in his letter to John of Antioch.

Could Leo have chosen better words, ones that did not overlap with what some Nestorians were saying? Sure, I think his language is pretty clunky in some places. And St. Cyril could have picked a better phrase than "One nature of God the Word incarnate" (which came from Apollinarius). Nevertheless, those who accuse Cyril of Apollinarianism or Leo of Nestorianism are willfully misreading them.


An abstract substance cannot suffer. It was the Incarnate Word who suffered.

I agree, but the Incarnate Word, as hypostasis, suffered in his human nature, not his divine nature.


He is not saying that at all. He is saying that the Word of God because of His humanity is doing something that He would not simply because of His divinity. The flesh does nothing as if a distinct being. The divinity does nothing as if a distinct being. The Incarnate Word does both human and divine things because of His humanity and divinity.

This is what Leo is saying as well. At no point does he suggest that the human and divine natures are distinct beings, but he makes it clear that the unity is real and that the very same God-man does things according to both natures. But he also manages to avoid saying that the divine nature suffered or died. Pope Shenouda only manages to avoid this, if he can really be said to avoid it, in a muddled way: "We say that, essentially, the Divine nature is not susceptible to suffering yet He suffered due to His humanity, and was physically crucified." The divine nature cannot suffer, but did suffer (because of the human nature)? Because of his indistinction between hypostasis and nature, he contradicts himself in the same sentence. I understand what he is trying to say, and I understand what he means by "nature", but that does not do away with the basic problem of using the same word in what should be two definitions. It leads to a confusion of terms and a confusion of natures. There's no room in this language for describing the distinctions meaningfully, therefore, in the monophysite view, there really can be no distinction.


However, the Alexandrine tradition (and thus the Non-Chalcedonians) generally try to avoid of thinking of what may be theoretically true about Christ and rather sticking to what is actually true about Christ's concrete reality. In this reality, Christ does not exist as two in nature, being human on one hand and divine on the other. He exists as one hollistic and united theandric being according to nature.

Did the divine nature suffer? We cannot answer this question correctly without making a distinction between the natures.

With respect to the will, if Christ did not have a human choice to obey or disobey God's will, that is, if he did not, as man, voluntarily conform to God's will, then he cannot be fully man. Therefore, it is essential to maintain two wills as well as two natures. The monothelite position confuses distinction with opposition and therefore cannot accept two wills, thereby diminishing the fullness of Christ's humanity.

Pope Shenouda clearly believes that the human will obeying the divine will eliminates the distinction, since he (erroneously) equates distinction with opposition. Therefore, if one accepts his view, the two wills are mingled with change and confusion: "the Son, in His Incarnation on earth, was fulfilling the Will of the heavenly Father. Thus it must be that He Who united with the manhood had One Will. In fact, Sin is nothing but a conflict between man’s will and God’s. But remember that our Lord Jesus Christ had no sin at all...Therefore, His Will was that of
the Father."

I would also point out Fr. Paul Verghese's explicit rejection of the Sixth Ecumenical Council here (http://orthodoxinfo.com/ecumenism/mono_share.aspx).

b) We are unable to accept the dithelete formula, attributing will and energy to the natures rather than to the hypostasis. We can only affirm the one united and unconfused divine-human nature, will and energy of Christ the incarnate Lord.

c) We find that this Sixth Council exalts as its standard mainly the teaching of Leo and Agatho, popes of Rome, paying only lip-service to the teachings of the Blessed Cyril. We regard Leo as a heretic for his teaching that the will and operation of Christ is to be attributed to the two natures of Christ rather than to the one hypostasis.

Since this teaching of Leo is our teaching as well, we really are heretics in the view of the non-Chalcedonians. Regardless of who is right or wrong, it seems plain to me that we do not share the same faith.


If the formulas are associated with certain heresies but their adherents actually claim an orthodox substance to them, those adherents cannot be viewed as heretics.Accordingly, we cannot jump to label the Non-Chalcedonians heretics simply because they claim "one nature" and "one will" and "one 'energeia'".

The Monothelitism and Monoenergism denounced at the Sixth Ecumenical Council are the same heresies that were proposed to, and accepted by, the Coptic and Armenian churches in the Pact of Union.


First is the Eutychian idea that the human ousia is dissolved into the divine ousia and thus there is only a divine will to go along with it.
Second is the idea that the humanity and divinity become united on the level of ousia and form a third "theandric" ousia and that the will of Christ is according to this third ousia. Finally, is the idea that the humanity of Christ was subsumed into the hypostasis of the Word and that thus the humanity loses its natural properties.

I do not see how the acts of the council are limited to these definitions. Clearly anyone who refuses to distinguish between the divine and human wills is condemned.


Rather, the Non-Chalcedonians appear to speak of the humanity and divinity remain distinct according to ousia and thus retaining all their properties.

Actually, they do not consider the will to be a property of the natures but of the hypostasis. Therefore, they do not allow for any distinction between the wills (not even theoretical), which for them equates to contradiction: "Since the Will is One, the Act is necessarily One.
Here we do not distinguish between the two natures." Therefore, even where they are willing to distinguish the natures, they will not distinguish the wills.

But two wills in accord cannot be considered the same will, otherwise there would never have been a Fall in the angelic world or in man.

[Christopher Dombrowski]

the word of god, Christ, is a person who is solely divine, that is to say the ego of Christ, the timeless individual subsisting person, before the union.

Agreed. I personally would confess one (simple) nature of the Word before the union, unlike Eutyches who (for some reason) confessed two natures before the union.




He, the divine logos, consents to be incarnate. This means that he takes flesh from the virgin, and united it to himself. Therefore he is of the divine father and truly divine, and of the theotokos and truly man. He is in the divine nature, in that the logos is from, and remains divine, and in the human nature in that the logos enfleshed is from and remains human. He is subsistently both simultaneously. Hypostaticaly.

If that is all that is meant by "in", then I do agree that the Word assumed humanity and remained perfect and complete in humanity and in divinity after the union.




Now, those maintaining that hypostasis is synonymous with physis will RIGHTLY speak of one incarnate Nature of the word "without division, change, mingling or separation." Yet those who speak of one incarnate PERSON who is the Word speak truly: both denounce nestorius and eutyches.

Again, I have problems with translating hypostasis as person, as the root of the word person is persona, a word that was equivicated with prosopon. As I previously mentioned, one prosopon of Christ was a confession of the Nestorians. You could very well have Nestorians confessing one person of Christ. I thus think it does not protect the hypostatic union as well in saying one person as it does in translating hypostasis as being and confessing one being of Christ. But if by person you do mean hypostasis, I agree that confessing one hypostasis generally protects against Nestorianism, given that it is used in its real Patristic meaning.




However the chalcedonian, in speaking of person is setting up a single point of reference for the union. When orientals speak of the union, it is hard for me, because I do not see how this union is to be spoken of: are the natures abstractly united to each other?

The point of reference and locus of the union for a Non-Chalcedonian is the theandric being, and the one theandric mode of being that He exists in. The natures are not abstractly united to each other, they are rather hypostatically united, meaning that the individuated humanity does not become a whole 'nother being nor does it become an abstract possession of the Word, but rather (similar to enhypostasia) it is assumed as the very being of the Word, and thus the humanity and divinity both become hypostatic in the Incarnate Word, in that they are energized by the same one theandric being.




Where is the person willing and operating?

Within the one theandric mode of being.




Natures don't function on their own, persons act according to their nature.

Definitely correct. There is no action save from that generated from a hypostasis. The hypostasis may act within and according to His various elements, but it is always still the one hypostasis performing the actions within His one conjunct or united theandric mode of being.




If Christ acts in two distinctly SEPARATE ways, it implies two persons! So there would be one theandric nature that is not confused or separated that one person acts in accordance with?

Well, I would not deny that the actions of Jesus Christ are varied in substance. Certain things He does are things that He wouldn't do if He were simply human and other things He does He wouldn't do if He were simply divine. But yes, the one hypostasis acts in unity rather than in distinction. To suggest that He subsists in and operates in two modes of being in the union is, in my mind, to suggest that He is essentially two distinct beings.




The very terminology is deceptive though and leads one to think more of fusion than union...

The only reason, I think, that "one theandric nature" would sound like a fusion is if we are having a hard time conceiving nature as meaning being and rather are sticking to understanding it as simply meaning substance.




Is this the distinction then? That a person and their nature inseparable on oriental thinking because a person always behaves according tovhis nature?

I would say again it depends on what you mean by "person". If you mean hypostasis, I think you aren't quite understanding. In Oriental thinking, we would not say "the hypostasis acts according to its nature". This would be redundant. For we understand nature to simply mean hypostasis. It would almost be as to say "the hypostasis acts according to Himself". So again, the understanding is the very equivication of hypostasis and nature.

[Christopher Dombrowski]

If the distinction remains in place, then there are still two natures. So I cannot understand the difficulty of saying "in two natures".

As to the historical rejection, the answer should be obvious. Chalcedon made us of "one hypostasis", but when some were asked what they meant by it, they answered that it was equivalent to "prosopon". It was thus possible for some to understand the Creed to mean "one person in two beings". And given that the traditional definition of nature was exactly that, it's entirely understandable that the Non-Chalcedonians rejected the terminology. The nature of the Second Council of Constantinople should substantiate such a claim. A certain Nestorianism was present in the Chalcedonian Church as a result of Chalcedon such that Second Council of Constantinople had to primarily concern itself with heretical interpretations of Chalcedon.

I continue to reject "in two natures" because I do not see it as an equivication of confessing the two natures to remain distinct according to substance and because I have not yet seen a reasonable explanation as to what the phrase means. I can accept the notion of "He is recognized by us in two natures" which implies that the distinction is a mental and theoretical acknowledgement of the twoness of the humanity and divinity according to substance. Yet typically a Chalcedonian will go further and insist on asserting that "Christ Himself is in two natures". This phrase, in contrast, sounds to me to be speaking of Christ's being, the locus and resting of His subsistence. I cannot understand how this phrase could make sense and be orthodox. If, on one hand, we are meaning that "Christ Himself is in two modes of being", I do not see how this is not Nestorian. If, however, on the other hand, we are meaning "Christ Himself is in two abstract substances", I do not understand how this is possible. How can Christ's subsistence in His humanity and divinity be truly two if the distinction between His humanity and divinity is merely an abstraction? I'm open to other explanations, but this is all I have seen yet far.




I do recognize and understand it, but it is not applicable to Chalcedon.

Perhaps if Chalcedon had explicitly addressed this point it would not have become an issue. Yet it did not. And on top of this, as I pointed out, there were reports of an equivication of "hypostasis" and "prosopon". If this was actually the case, that Chalcedon was meaning personality by hypostasis, and if it was using the traditional meaning of nature (that was "being" until 553), then the Chalcedonian Creed was truly heretical. I view this as very much a possibility, though I am not 100% convinced.




Exactly. This seems to me to make it perfectly clear, irrespective of the Tome or the Council of Ephesus. Obviously the Council did not mean to say "one hypostasis in two hypostases", a redundant and meaningless phrase.

Yet it could have been redefining hypostasis and not physis and could therefore have been saying "one personality in two beings".




Because the phrase plainly meant something different, when Cyril dealt with it, from what it meant when itappeared at Chalcedon.

If it was so plain then why did massive amounts of Christians in Africa and the Middle East interpet Chalcedon to be teaching that Christ was two of what they understood hypostasis to mean?




This indicates the deficiency of using terminology that does not distinguish between hypostasis and nature. The Chalcedonian distinction allows us to say, without contradiction, "one theandric hypostasis in two natures of God the Word Incarnate."

I don't know that "one theandric hypostasis in two natures of God the Word Incarnate" is necessarily orthodox. Also I don't understand why you view "one Incarnate nature of God the Word who is from two natures (in theory) in and after the union" as necessarily deficient in the context of the equivication of nature and hypostasis. To me it appears that the different formulas fit the different understandings of terms and there is no "defficiency" in these different usages.




To answer your question (and I admit that I have been imprecise/ confused in my expression) I think a Chalcedonian must clearly accept what you call the "Justinian definition" regarding the distinction.

That's understandable. It was a definition delivered by a council that is regarded as ecumenical by the EOC.




Not that Cyril's definition is "wrong", but his indistinction of "hypostasis" and "physis" was an imprecision that had to be clarified.

I don't see what makes that an imprecision. Cyril knew his terms. He knew what he was talking about. He didn't have trouble expressing himself, and when we understand the way he used terms there is absolutely nothing short of orthodoxy in what he had to say.




We don't need to say that there were two "real and distinct individuations" (in theory) before the union,

Erm...

I think you're mixing up formulas a little bit.

"From two natures before the union" is a formula that has never been adopted by the mainstream Non-Chalcedonians. It was first uttered by Eutyches at the synod in Constantinople where he was first condemned in 448. Dioscorus, on the contrary, did not confess "from two natures before the union", but only "a union from two natures" and "from two natures after the union". To suggest two natures before the union in any manner is heresy, and is possibly suggesting of the view that the flesh of Christ came down from Heaven that Eutyches was accused of. For an orthodox believer, Christ was one simple divine hypostasis before the union, and the "from two natures" formula only comes into play with respect to the union.

Also, let me also make the point about the "two individuations" clear. As per the work of Severus of Antioch, the Non-Chalcedonians acknowledge that there is a truly individuated instance of divinity and a truly individuated instance of humanity in Christ. Thus it would be appropriate to say that even after the union there are two individuated substances. The difference comes into play when we speak of being. Though there are two individuated substances, there is only one theandric individual, one being.




because we do not identify the physis with the hypostasis. It is impossible for a nature, defined in this way, to exist without a hypostasis.

But the only answer to this reality for an orthodox Chalcedonianism must be the enhypostasia of the humanity to form the one theandric hypostasis of the Word Incarnate, not to suggest that the humanity forms a distinct hypostasis as the Nestorians do.




Now, the Second Council of Constantinople says that the difference between the natures is abstract- this is because they are united to a single hypostasis, so to conceive of their difference, we must think of them apart from hypostasis. The natures themselves however are not abstractions, because they are each united to the hypostasis. I would also say that "theoretical" does not mean "not real"- the term "theoretical" is used as a safeguard against regarding the natures as separate beings- nevertheless, the distinction between the natures is quite real.

Perhaps according to their compositional substance. But when we get down to their concrete and existential reality, we must admit that they become one as a hypostasis.




Considering the natures themselves, John Damascene says this:

The phrase "one hypostasis in two natures" allows us to maintain, on the one hand, that Christ was a single subject, and on the other, that Christ could act according to one nature distinctly from the other. Thus we can say that God suffered and was buried, because the hypostasis that was crucified for us was God and man, one subject without division. At the same time, we are safeguarded from suggesting that the impassible divine nature suffered or died, because the natures are clearly distinct. I do not see how the non-Chalcedonian formulas can clearly maintain this last safeguard; rather, they trip over themselves and stray into dangerous territory in trying to explain Christ's unity as well as his distinct human and divine attributes using the same word, "nature."

If by "in two natures", John is simply asserting that Christ remains composed of a perfect humanity and a perfect divinity, I don't really see anything lacking in orthodoxy in his explanation. I don't know that he entirely understands the Non-Chalcedonian tradition, however. I think the tradition of theoretically considering the humanity and divinity as if they are two distinct being, and thus confessing that Christ is "from two natures (in theory)" reasonably covers the continued distinction of the humanity and divinity in Christ. However, I agree that they are somewhat missing out on something in the Chalcedonian tradition of speaking of the humanity and divinity as two substances, and I know that I do enjoy making use of this idea myself. But also, I do think that even speaking of the term nature between the three Christological traditions of the East in general leads into confusing territory, and as such I wish people would just start substituting substance, being, person, or some other equivication according to which of these they mean by nature.




No, they would not admit this, for the same reason they could not confess that Mary is Theotokos. The Logos and the only-begotten Son of God are the same. The Son of God is an eternal person of the trinity, so one cannot say the Son was crucified without saying that God was crucified. If they did not think God could be born from the Virgin, how could they accept that he had been crucified?

The Nestorians deny Theotokos because they either regard it as the birthing of the Triune divinity or because they conceive of the Logos as a distinct being from Jesus. In response to Cyril's accusation of "two sons", however, they began to identify the term "Son" with the one prosopon of Christ rather than with the hypostasis of the Logos. Thus, they would be able to confess that Christ the Son was born of Mary and crucified, while qualifying that with the claim that the Logos was not born or crucified.




Leo plainly says 'we all confess that the only-begotten Son of God was crucified and was buried, following what the apostle said, "If they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of majesty."'

If Leo were Nestorian, he would not say "only-begotten Son of God", nor would he identify the crucified one as the "Lord of Majesty." Both of these plainly indicate that God was crucified, and in fact Pope Shenouda uses these same phrases to prove the one nature in The Nature of Christ, though he still misinterprets Leo.

Leo also says 'the Son of God took flesh from the virgin from whom he was born,' indicating that Mary is Theotokos, since he says that not only the flesh but the Son of God was born from the virgin.

All of this is still possibly Nestorian if we take into account the Nestorian identification of personality between the Logos and the Man Jesus. Leo could thus very well confess that the divine and human prosopon of Christ was crucified while not necessarily recognizing that the being of the Logos was crucified. I'm not necessarily 100% convinced that Leo was consistent and convinced Nestorian; perhaps he was simply using rather poor and imprecise language. However, I have not yet seen a reasonable explanation of his talk of the Logos doing divine things while the flesh does fleshly things such that I could be convinced that Leo was not partially espousing Nestorianism.




Let's bring back the body-soul analogy that Cyril used for the hypostatic union. If we say that the soul is immortal, and the body is not, or that the soul engages in contemplation or prayer, while the body engages the physical world, is this to say that a human being is composed of two beings? I don't think so. Could Leo have chosen better words, ones that did not overlap with what some Nestorians were saying? Sure, I think his language is pretty clunky in some places.

Well, first we must consider that your two examples are rather different. One is a passive property, while the other is actual action. With respect to properties, I would have no problem admitting that immortality is a property of the soul while mortality is a property of the flesh. However, as to action, I would view your statements also as rather imprecise and possibly erroneous. In a truly hollistic and united human (which while we may not necessarily be, but I tend to view Jesus as), should not the body be involved in the act of prayer along with the soul, even as a united mode of being? And should not the soul be engaged and united with the flesh in the moving about in the physical world? If I were to sit down and really contemplate these matters before speaking of them, I would not say that the soul prays as if the body is not involved in this process, but would rather view them as a united whole and say that the theandric human being is praying with respect to both his body and his soul. So it is possible that Leo was simply using misleading language. But I don't understand why he would not have seen the same problems with his language that the Non-Chalcedonians saw if he actually believed in one theandric being with all its elements engaged as one.




And St. Cyril could have picked a better phrase than "One nature of God the Word incarnate" (which came from Apollinarius).

Like I've said a couple of times before, I don't see any problem in Cyril using the phrase he did in the context that the phrase was used. Sure it was connected to Apollinaris, but part of the context was Cyril continually insisting that Jesus Christ did have a rational soul and that he intended no confusion of the humanity and divinity.




I agree, but the Incarnate Word, as hypostasis, suffered in his human nature, not his divine nature.

I still have problems with such language. You're making it sound as if that Jesus' humanity and His divinity exist as two distinct modes of being and that He exists in His humanity as one center of being and His divinity as another center of being. While I would admit that Jesus suffered because of His humanity and not because of His divinity, I would still have to say that He experienced it as one united whole.




This is what Leo is saying as well. At no point does he suggest that the human and divine natures are distinct beings, but he makes it clear that the unity is real and that the very same God-man does things according to both natures. But he also manages to avoid saying that the divine nature suffered or died. Pope Shenouda only manages to avoid this, if he can really be said to avoid it, in a muddled way: "We say that, essentially, the Divine nature is not susceptible to suffering yet He suffered due to His humanity, and was physically crucified." The divine nature cannot suffer, but did suffer (because of the human nature)? Because of his indistinction between hypostasis and nature, he contradicts himself in the same sentence. I understand what he is trying to say, and I understand what he means by "nature", but that does not do away with the basic problem of using the same word in what should be two definitions. It leads to a confusion of terms and a confusion of natures. There's no room in this language for describing the distinctions meaningfully, therefore, in the monophysite view, there really can be no distinction.

I do not see how His language is muddled. The only was I could see this language being confusing is if we are still not open to thinking of nature as meaning either ousia or hypostasis. The phrase to me is saying "the individuated divine being of the Logos is not in and of Himself susceptible to suffering, but He suffered only because of the humanity that He took on to Himself". He is not saying that the Logos cannot suffer. You are putting words in his mouth. He said that the Logos is not susceptible to suffering. He only suffered because of the humanity that He assumed into Himself as His own. To say that a divine being is not susceptible to suffering but did suffer because of a humanity that He later assumed is not a contradiction. And no, actually, Pope Shenouda here is not avoiding saying that the divine nature suffered. He is saying entirely contrary, that because of the humanity that the divine nature assumed, He did suffer. And in the context of nature being an equivication of hypostasis, it is not heretical to say that the divine nature of the Logos suffered because if His humanity.




Did the divine nature suffer? We cannot answer this question correctly without making a distinction between the natures.

If we are to use the Justinian interpretation of nature, the distinction of the natures is already inherently made, because we must understand there to be a difference in substance between the humanity and the divinity. And in this context we must answer that the divine nature did not suffer. However, in the context of the Cyrilline interpretation of nature, the answer is different. For one thing, to speak of the Logos after the union as a divine nature is pretty sketchy. This can only be true because His being as divine preceeded His being as human and because His divinity is self-subsistent while His humanity is not. It is thus better to speak only of a theandric nature with respect to the Cyrilline definition of nature. However, if we are to use the phrase "divine nature" because of the forming justification, it would still be appropriate to say that the divine nature suffered, because either way we are simply saying that the Logos suffered.




With respect to the will, if Christ did not have a human choice to obey or disobey God's will, that is, if he did not, as man, voluntarily conform to God's will, then he cannot be fully man.

This matter is slightly paradoxical, as speaking of the communciation of human and divine attributes in the Incarnate Logos generally is. On one hand, as a human, the Word was provided the choice to obey the will of the Father and He voluntarily submitted. On the other hand, however, the Word inherently had to submit to the will of the Father because His will is divine. So while Jesus Christ was given the choice and did submit, it was also impossible for Him to have denied the will of the Father.




Therefore, it is essential to maintain two wills as well as two natures.

Again, only according to the substance of the will. There are theoretically two wills because there is conjoint content in the will that is otherwise separate, if not for the union. However, when we consider the reality of the union. We must recognize that Jesus Christ did not will as a human on one hand and as God on the other, as if there are two centers of being, and thus it is also reasonable to say that according to being there is one theandric will.




The monothelite position confuses distinction with opposition and therefore cannot accept two wills, thereby diminishing the fullness of Christ's humanity.

I don't know about that. For one thing, Nestorianism did not suggest an opposition of the wills. They either taught that there were two cojunct wills according to the two beings, two wills regarded as being expressed in perfect communion and harmony, or they regarded the will as one of the principles of the unity of the Logos and the Man, and thus believed that they both possessed the same (divine or theandric, I do not know this point) will. Therefore, aside from the fact that some Chalcedonians sometimes speak of the agony in the garden being an example of the human will resisting the divine will, the issue for the Non-Chalcedonians has generally not been opposition. It has rather been the same issue as with the natures, that "two natures" and "two wills" both seemed to be suggesting two cojunt and harmonius beings, not that they seemed to be suggesting two oppositional beings.




Pope Shenouda clearly believes that the human will obeying the divine will eliminates the distinction, since he (erroneously) equates distinction with opposition.

I would admit that the English translation of The Nature of Christ does appear to not sufficiently take into account the natural human desires that are not found in the divine will but are not oppositional to this will, desires that Jesus Christ must be recognized as having if He is to be fully human. And I do see how this text appears to suggest that if the human will becomes harmonious to the divine will that they become on and the same. So I'm not recognizing this as my manifesto. I simply referenced it on one particular point. I don't know that Pope Shenouda III is a flawless teacher of proper Christology, and if he is it may be the case that He is not expressed accurately in English. But I do not regard him as a core definer of the faith in the first place.




Therefore, if one accepts his view, the two wills are mingled with change and confusion: "the Son, in His Incarnation on earth, was fulfilling the Will of the heavenly Father. Thus it must be that He Who united with the manhood had One Will. In fact, Sin is nothing but a conflict between man’s will and God’s. But remember that our Lord Jesus Christ had no sin at all...Therefore, His Will was that of
the Father."

In so far as this text seems to suggest that the human will loses its properties distinct from the divine will, that opposition is the only distinction that the human will can have from the divine will, or that the substances of the Christological will are changed, mixed, mingled, or confused, I do not subscribe to this document. The only "difference" that may appear between our will and that of Christ's is that our will includes sin while His does not and that His will is transformed into the perfect and divinized (thinking along the lines of theosis here) human will that we hopefully will all eventually have ourselves. I do not believe any of these erroneous principles actually reflect the Tradition of the Oriental Orthodox churches. As a matter of fact, Severus of Antioch taught that while the human nature and divine nature become one and the human will and divine will become one, the united theandric nature and united theandric will retain all the properties of the former two natures and wills. Severus is clearly far more representative of the Tradition of the Oriental churches than Shenouda.




I would also point out Fr. Paul Verghese's explicit rejection of the Sixth Ecumenical Council here (http://orthodoxinfo.com/ecumenism/mono_share.aspx).

b) We are unable to accept the dithelete formula, attributing will and energy to the natures rather than to the hypostasis. We can only affirm the one united and unconfused divine-human nature, will and energy of Christ the incarnate Lord.

c) We find that this Sixth Council exalts as its standard mainly the teaching of Leo and Agatho, popes of Rome, paying only lip-service to the teachings of the Blessed Cyril. We regard Leo as a heretic for his teaching that the will and operation of Christ is to be attributed to the two natures of Christ rather than to the one hypostasis.

Since this teaching of Leo is our teaching as well, we really are heretics in the view of the non-Chalcedonians.

There is far more variation in the perception of the Non-Chalcedonians towards the Chalcedonian tradition than you seem to given it credit for. There are even some that would maintain that while the historical councils of the Chalcedonian church contained certain heretical elements that nonetheless some of the current members of the EOC are flawless in their Christology according to their interpretations. I agree that it is possible for a tradition to be partially heretical because of the contributions of some of its members while some others remain orthodox though perhaps overly tolerant of heresy.




Regardless of who is right or wrong, it seems plain to me that we do not share the same faith.

I personally think the issue is slightly more complicated than you are giving it credit for. While I used to be firmly Eastern Orthodox and was baptized and chrismated as a convert, I am currently "in limbo" (so to speak) between the EOC and the OOC. So I am not really engaging this as the interaction between two people of two different churches.

I think the oneness of faith rather varies according to individuals. I think some of the Oriental Orthodox are overly strict Monophysites who in their fervour reject speak even of two ousia or substances and have no cconcern for entertaining the concerns of the Chalcedonians but only sticking to the strickness of the letter of Cyrilline Christology. On the opposite end of the spectrum, I think there are some Eastern Orthodox who take the writings of figures like Leo and Maximus the Confessor too far and wind up teaching two centers of being for the supposedly hypostatically one Christ. Then there are moderate Orientals who realize the concerns of the Chalcedonians and are comfortable of speak of a certain level of twoness in Christ and also Chalcedonians who realize the concerns of the Non-Chalcedonians and sufficiently confess the oneness. While there is no compatability with respect to the more extreme individuals within these groups, I think there is definitely a oneness of faith among the more moderate believers that I mentioned later. Perhaps the ecumenical discussions have included many of these individuals and thus they have been inclined to find the oneness of the 2 traditions.

In so far as your denial of oneness in faith in general goes, I do not agree. I think there are entirely orthodox figures in the Chalcedonian church who somehow manage to adhere to the EO Tradition and likewise for the Orientals and these types do have a oneness of faith. What the historical status of orthodoxy of certain councils and individuals is another matter; having some elements of heresy in one's tradition would not necessarily preclude any individual being orthodox themselves.




The Monothelitism and Monoenergism denounced at the Sixth Ecumenical Council are the same heresies that were proposed to, and accepted by, the Coptic and Armenian churches in the Pact of Union.

Given how colored the understandings of the Chalcedonians were by the Justinian definition of nature, I don't think that the Third Council of Constantinople even truly understood the position of the Coptic church. I haven't personally read the Pact of Union. If you have perhaps you could tell me about it. But otherwise there is quite a lot in 3rd Constantinople trying to represent their opponents as if they were talking about will according to nature/ousia rather than will according to hypostasis, which probably does not accurately represent the Orientals.




I do not see how the acts of the council are limited to these definitions. Clearly anyone who refuses to distinguish between the divine and human wills is condemned.

Are you sure? There are almost always qualifiers associated with such condemnations explaining exactly what shade of "monophysitism" or "monothelitism" (or what not) that they are speaking of.




Actually, they do not consider the will to be a property of the natures but of the hypostasis.

I'm aware. My point is that they would still consider the hypostatic will to be theoretically dual in its substance. As I said before, Severus of Antioch taught that the hypostatic nature and the hypostatic will retained all the same properties from the two natures and two wills from before they were united.




Therefore, they do not allow for any distinction between the wills (not even theoretical), which for them equates to contradiction: "Since the Will is One, the Act is necessarily One.
Here we do not distinguish between the two natures." Therefore, even where they are willing to distinguish the natures, they will not distinguish the wills.

Are you quoting Shenouda again? Trust me, there are other figures far more representative of Oriental Orthodoxy than him. On top of this, I don't know if Shenouda even speaks English and therefore the translation might not be that accurate. And I don't know that that quote even necessarily indicates that the speaker believes that there cannot be a theoretical distinction according to substance. You will have to cite more sources to advance such a claim.

[Daniel Smith]

I understand now: the key is really the word "being". A being is a persons totality, all of what makes up the hypostasis.

So to say that there is one nature of the word incarnate means that there is one being who is God incarnate, like you say, one theandric being. So for you, nature and being are convertible terms?

Therefore, the word is hypostatically ( prosopon, ego, and ousia together, I.e. "being") united to the flesh which he takes from the theotokos and makes it part of his being without confusion or separation. Of two natures and continuing "in" two natures, if by "in" we mean he preserved the properties of each distinctly and yet continued to be one true being continually from two natures. There is a distinction of acts in the word incarnate, but only in theory since it is the one personal ego, the Word who performs all activities. The divine ousia as conceived of as theoretically distinct from the humanity did NOT suffer in the crucifixion, but hypostatically the Theandric Being did suffer. The communication of idioms is in effect: God became man to die for us. Emmanuel was murdered. But the divine in him did not suffer directly, only if at all, by participation.

Because there is one theandric being, the word incarnate, all his acts spring forth from unity: it is not two who will, but one. It us not two heal, but one. All acts of will are one. However, since all acts of will are made in accordance with nature, and his nature is not elementally one, but composite of two, so his will is from two and continues to be "in" two because the theandric will is a continual property of the theandric nature. Therefore when the Word Incarnate wills to feed the 5000 the will proper to the humanity assents. When the Word incarnate wills that the cup should pass, still he assents to the will proper to the divinity. In all things it is one being who moves the will and actively wills: but because the will is a property of nature, and Christ is not fused, but united natures, so there must be not one fused but united will, which can be theoretically distinguished between that which is proper to the divine and human natures.

When The Word Incarnate wills the cup to pass, he is expressing his fear of the trialsby virtue of the humanity. When he assents to the fathers will, it is likewise by virtue of the humanity. In all things it is one being willing and acting, but we have to be able to talk about the wills somehow. Each nature retains that which is proper to it, including the wills. But he who wills is one, not two.

It might be said that will is not a property of natures but of persons. This is not exactly right. Any person acts according to their nature. If the action or willing is done in accordance with nature then WHAT is willed must be a property of the nature, while the willing is an act of the ego, the self. So the incarnate word alone wills all things, those in accordance with the divine nature in union with the human, and those in accord with the human nature in accord with the divine.

The main point is that he who wills is one but he as truly a theandric being feels things human and things divine, distinctly but never separately and the human feelings and desires are always WILLFULY submitted to the divine.

I am sorry if I seem slow, but I do believe this topic is worth the effort to truly listen to each other

[Christopher Dombrowski]

I understand now: the key is really the word "being".

Another word that can be substituted is "individual", which I see as meaning nearly the same thing. Another word that I see a lot is "person", but I try to avoid this word because it has connections to Nestorianism (the Nestorians of whom were and are willing to confess one prosopon or persona) and thus does not protect the hypostatic union as well as "being" does.




A being is a persons totality, all of what makes up the hypostasis.

Yeah, it is the sum of the parts.




So to say that there is one nature of the word incarnate means that there is one being who is God incarnate, like you say, one theandric being.

Yes, it does not mean that the humanity is in anyway converted, changed, mixed, or mingled with respect to the divinity but only that it receives the divinity indwelling it and joins it in one mode of being.




So for you, nature and being are convertible terms?

They can be. I tend to use nature that way. But I'm also comfortable speaking of nature according to the Justinian definition, although I may make different statements about nature in this respect than most Chalcedonians.




Therefore, the word is hypostatically ( prosopon, ego, and ousia together, I.e. "being") united to the flesh which he takes from the theotokos and makes it part of his being without confusion or separation. Of two natures and continuing "in" two natures, if by "in" we mean he preserved the properties of each distinctly and yet continued to be one true being continually from two natures.

Yes, I'm comfortable with someone claiming "in two natures" if by this they simply mean that the humanity and divinity maintain distinct substances and properites while communicating these to the hypostasis of the Word. Personally I tend to avoid using "in two natures" myself because this is not what I'm inclined to understand the phrase to mean (semantically and historically).




There is a distinction of acts in the word incarnate, but only in theory since it is the one personal ego, the Word who performs all activities. The divine ousia as conceived of as theoretically distinct from the humanity did NOT suffer in the crucifixion, but hypostatically the Theandric Being did suffer. The communication of idioms is in effect: God became man to die for us. Emmanuel was murdered. But the divine in him did not suffer directly, only if at all, by participation.

Agreed. For example, the flesh of Christ was pierced with nails but His divine spirit was not. I'm comfortable speaking of the substances of Christ in distinction as passive recepients of action, similar to something like "Johnny threw a rock and it 'flew' through the air". However, actually kinetic and subjective performance of action and experience of states I will only attribute to the hypostasis. This is why I'm comfortable saying "the flesh of Christ was pierced".




Because there is one theandric being, the word incarnate, all his acts spring forth from unity: it is not two who will, but one. It us not two heal, but one. All acts of will are one. However, since all acts of will are made in accordance with nature, and his nature is not elementally one, but composite of two, so his will is from two and continues to be "in" two because the theandric will is a continual property of the theandric nature.

While I again would not use "in" to describe the continuing reality, I agree with the meaning you are associating with it. I would rather say something like "from two continuing ousia after the union" than saying "in two ousia after the union", because I believe desire/will rests in the hypostasis, not in the abstract substances.




Therefore when the Word Incarnate wills to feed the 5000 the will proper to the humanity assents.

I'm not understanding you here. You're speaking almost as if a will is a subject capable of assenting...




When the Word incarnate wills that the cup should pass, still he assents to the will proper to the divinity. In all things it is one being who moves the will and actively wills: but because the will is a property of nature, and Christ is not fused, but united natures, so there must be not one fused but united will, which can be theoretically distinguished between that which is proper to the divine and human natures.

I don't know that the idea of "fusion" really could come into play with things that are not substantial, but yeah I agree.




When The Word Incarnate wills the cup to pass, he is expressing his fear of the trialsby virtue of the humanity. When he assents to the fathers will, it is likewise by virtue of the humanity. In all things it is one being willing and acting, but we have to be able to talk about the wills somehow.

I would have to say that the assent to the Father's will is probably something that occurs by virtue of both His humanity and divinity.




Each nature retains that which is proper to it, including the wills.

I'm having issues with this statement. I wouldn't say that the humanity of Christ wills nor would I say that the divinity of Christ wills. Rather only the theandric hypostasis wills. I don't think will is something that can be considered to have existence aside from hypostasis, even though Christ's will is generated from His humanity on one hand and from His divinity on the other hand.




It might be said that will is not a property of natures but of persons. This is not exactly right. Any person acts according to their nature. If the action or willing is done in accordance with nature then WHAT is willed must be a property of the nature, while the willing is an act of the ego, the self. So the incarnate word alone wills all things, those in accordance with the divine nature in union with the human, and those in accord with the human nature in accord with the divine.

Again, I wouldn't say that will has any actual reality in non-personal substances that we could speak of. Sure, will is generated from them as a property of them, but that property never really rests in the ousia but always the hypostasis.




The main point is that he who wills is one but he as truly a theandric being feels things human and things divine, distinctly but never separately and the human feelings and desires are always WILLFULY submitted to the divine.

So long as it is recognized that the distinction is in the quality, property, or substance of the feelings, and not in their manner, mode, focus, or center of being felt.




I am sorry if I seem slow, but I do believe this topic is worth the effort to truly listen to each other

Well, you're more willing to listen than most. I've got to give you credit for that.

[Vasiliki D.]

I just wanted to insert some basics for people, like me, who are trying to recall the origins of this issue.

Here is an excerpt from http://www.greekorthodox.org.au/general/faq/faqhistoryofchristianity


The fourth (Chalcedon, 451AD) – the heresy of Eutychius, who affirmed that the human nature of Christ was so much deified that it was eventually absorbed by his divinity; therefore in Christ would have been just one nature, the divine. Against Eutychianism (or Monophysitism), the Church stated that although the hypostatic union is perfect from the very moment of Christ’s conception, none of the two natures – divine and human – is changed or abolished. Contemplated from the point of view of his two unconfused natures, Christ is truly God and truly man; contemplated from the point of view of the undivided hypostasis/person, there is one Christ who lived the features of his both natures in a complex way (a mode labelled by later theologians as theandricity, Godmanhood).

... and the origins for the current EO's different opinion to the EO (an excerpt from Wikipedia):



Miracle during the Council of Chalcedon

The Council of Chalcedon was the fourth Ecumenical Council of the Christian Church which took place in the city of Chalcedon in the year 451. It repudiated the Eutychian doctrine of monophysitism, and set forth the Chalcedonian Creed, which describes the "full humanity and full divinity" of Jesus Christ, the Second Person of the Holy Trinity.

The council sat in the cathedral consecrated in her name. Present at the council were 630 representatives from all the local Christian Churches. Both the Monophysite and Orthodox parties were well-represented at the council, so the meetings were quite contentious, and no decisive consensus could be reached. Patriarch Anatolius of Constantinople suggested that the council submit the decision to the Holy Spirit, acting through Saint Euphemia.

Both parties wrote a confession of their faith and placed them in the tomb of the saint Euphemia which was sealed in the presence of the emperor Marcian (450-457), who placed the imperial seal on it and set a guard to watch over it for three days. During these days both sides fasted and prayed. After three days the tomb was opened and the scroll with the Orthodox confession was seen in the right hand of St Euphemia while the scroll of the Monophysites lay at her feet.
This miracle is attested by a letter sent by the council to Pope Leo I:

"For it was God who worked, and the triumphant Euphemia who crowned the meeting as for a bridal, and who, taking our definition of the Faith as her own confession, presented it to her Bridegroom by our most religious Emperor and Christ-loving Empress, appeasing all the tumult of opponents and establishing our confession of the Truth as acceptable to Him, and with hand and tongue setting her seal to the votes of us all in proclamation thereof."

- [Knight, Kevin, ed., "Letter from the Synod of Chalcedon to Leo (Letter 98)", Letters of Leo the Great, New Advent, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3604098.htm, retrieved on 2007-12-09

[Daniel Smith]

That may be, but todays "monophysites" denounce eutyches and appolinarius and proclaim one being, the word incarnate has united in himself humanity and divinity without change or mixture or separation, and that the divine and human substances retain all their proper properties in the one incarnate word. What is more orthodox than that? That is what Chalcedon was saying, but was butchering philosophical terms that led to confusion. I am not saying there have never been monophysites; but to be Monophysite n the historical sense is to be a Eutychian, and I know that both the Ethiopians and the Copts anathematize Eutyches...

And let's admit this now: in two natures MEANS that the person of Christ exists simultaneously as god and man, the natures being united in the person, so that both natures belong to the word as his own.

There is no difference from what Chalcedon INTENDED for in two natures and "from two natures in one being continuing with their I dividual properties unchanged." I know that THIS is what we mean by in two natures: that both equally belong to one divine person. But I agree moe with my oo friend, this is a clumsy formulation.

[Ryan]

It was thus possible for some to understand the Creed to mean "one person in two beings".

It is not possible if one actually reads the definition of Chalcedon (http://www.monachos.net/content/patristics/patristictexts/121-council-of-chalcedon-451-the-definition-of-faith-of-chalcedon), which confesses Mary as Theotokos and describes "the distinction of natures being in no way annulled by the union, but rather the characteristics of each nature being preserved and coming together to form one person and subsistence, not as parted or separated into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten God the Word, Lord Jesus Christ."

Whether one says "hypostasis" or "prosopon," identifying this single subject as "the same Son and Only-begotten God the Word" immediately rules out a Nestorian reading as anything but a willful misinterpretation.

Moreover, Nestorianism was repeatedly denounced at the Council, and Cyril was upheld as a standard of Orthodoxy. It was a truly Cyrilline council, in spirit if not always in exact terminology. Oftentimes the admittedly unfortunate part about Ibas' letter is brought up ("we have read his letter and found him orthodox")- however the context of this event is often neglected. In fact Ibas was being grilled for hours for the things he had said against Cyril; he is compelled to repeatedly denounce Nestorianism and affirm Cyril's orthodoxy, and only in this context was he accepted.


The nature of the Second Council of Constantinople should substantiate such a claim. A certain Nestorianism was present in the Chalcedonian Church as a result of Chalcedon such that Second Council of Constantinople had to primarily concern itself with heretical interpretations of Chalcedon.

Once again, later misinterpretations of a given council do not in any way prove that their misinterpretations were grounded in some genuine flaw in the council itself. Or would you admit St. Cyril's letter to John of Antioch as evidence that a certain Apollinarianism resulted from his formula "one nature of God the Word incarnate", which had to later be "corrected" by his letter?


I continue to reject "in two natures" because I do not see it as an equivication of confessing the two natures to remain distinct according to substance and because I have not yet seen a reasonable explanation as to what the phrase means.

It means that the two natures remain distinct according to substance, as you say. There is not just one nature "after the union." That is exactly what it means. "Of two natures" or "from two natures" are insufficient for this purpose; left alone, they can imply a mixture of natures.



I can accept the notion of "He is recognized by us in two natures" which implies that the distinction is a mental and theoretical acknowledgement of the twoness of the humanity and divinity according to substance. Yet typically a Chalcedonian will go further and insist on asserting that "Christ Himself is in two natures".

"Theoretical" does not mean "not real." The distinction is called theoretical because the actuality is the hypostasis, which unites the natures. Christ suffers in his human nature or performs miracles in his divine nature, but because the same hypostasis does these things, the distinction is in theory. Christ is in two natures because even after the union he continues to do things which can be distinctly attributed to one or the other natures, as St. Cyril acknowledges.


If, however, on the other hand, we are meaning "Christ Himself is in two abstract substances", I do not understand how this is possible. How can Christ's subsistence in His humanity and divinity be truly two if the distinction between His humanity and divinity is merely an abstraction?

The natures, insofar as the hypostasis abides in them, are not abstract. Christ's natural human body and soul are not abstractions. His divinity is not abstract. The natures can only be regarded as abstractions when we recognize the distinctions between them, but again, "abstract" here does not mean "not real."


If it was so plain then why did massive amounts of Christians in Africa and the Middle East interpet Chalcedon to be teaching that Christ was two of what they understood hypostasis to mean?

Perhaps because bogus theology was being used to further nationalistic political aims.

One may as well ask, "If the Gospel is so clear that Christ is God, why were there so many Arians?"


Also I don't understand why you view "one Incarnate nature of God the Word who is from two natures (in theory) in and after the union" as necessarily deficient in the context of the equivication of nature and hypostasis.

Because, in that context, the same word ("nature") is being used to describe two separate concepts, resulting in confusion.



Also, let me also make the point about the "two individuations" clear. As per the work of Severus of Antioch, the Non-Chalcedonians acknowledge that there is a truly individuated instance of divinity and a truly individuated instance of humanity in Christ. Thus it would be appropriate to say that even after the union there are two individuated substances. The difference comes into play when we speak of being. Though there are two individuated substances, there is only one theandric individual, one being.

How is this different from "one hypostasis in two natures"?


But the only answer to this reality for an orthodox Chalcedonianism must be the enhypostasia of the humanity to form the one theandric hypostasis of the Word Incarnate, not to suggest that the humanity forms a distinct hypostasis as the Nestorians do.

Thankfully Chalcedon rules out such an interpretation quite definitively.


The Nestorians deny Theotokos because they either regard it as the birthing of the Triune divinity or because they conceive of the Logos as a distinct being from Jesus. In response to Cyril's accusation of "two sons", however, they began to identify the term "Son" with the one prosopon of Christ rather than with the hypostasis of the Logos. Thus, they would be able to confess that Christ the Son was born of Mary and crucified, while qualifying that with the claim that the Logos was not born or crucified.

Again, Leo uses the phrase "Lord of Majesty," making it clear that God was crucified. Only stubborn misreading can make him out to be Nestorian.



In a truly hollistic and united human (which while we may not necessarily be, but I tend to view Jesus as), should not the body be involved in the act of prayer along with the soul, even as a united mode of being? And should not the soul be engaged and united with the flesh in the moving about in the physical world?

You make a good point. To clarify, while the human person hypostatically walks or prays, and therefore the body and soul both participate in these activities, prayer is still attributed to the soul while walking is an activity proper to the body. We cannot say "the soul walks" except in conjunction with the body.


While I would admit that Jesus suffered because of His humanity and not because of His divinity, I would still have to say that He experienced it as one united whole.

You and I are in agreement here. When you say "because of his humanity" or "because of his divinity," it is the same as "in" his humanity or divinity, but he experiences it has hypostasis. This allows us to say that God suffered and died but not in his divine nature.


To say that a divine being is not susceptible to suffering but did suffer because of a humanity that He later assumed is not a contradiction.

Only if we regard the use of the word "nature" here as that of two homonyms.


And no, actually, Pope Shenouda here is not avoiding saying that the divine nature suffered. He is saying entirely contrary, that because of the humanity that the divine nature assumed, He did suffer. And in the context of nature being an equivication of hypostasis, it is not heretical to say that the divine nature of the Logos suffered because if His humanity.

It is heretical unless one recognizes that the same word is being used for two very different definitions- hypostasis and substance. I see no indication that such a distinction is intended.

However, if we are to use the phrase "divine nature" because of the forming justification, it would still be appropriate to say that the divine nature suffered, because either way we are simply saying that the Logos suffered.

It can be given an Orthodox interpretation, but it would still be confusing. The Logos can be spoken of both as divine and as a theandric hypostasis, and there is nothing problematic here if we distinguish between the hypostasis and the nature. And of course the Logos was purely divine, both in nature and hypostasis, before the Incarnation.



There is far more variation in the perception of the Non-Chalcedonians towards the Chalcedonian tradition than you seem to given it credit for. There are even some that would maintain that while the historical councils of the Chalcedonian church contained certain heretical elements that nonetheless some of the current members of the EOC are flawless in their Christology according to their interpretations. I agree that it is possible for a tradition to be partially heretical because of the contributions of some of its members while some others remain orthodox though perhaps overly tolerant of heresy.

The problem is, we are not speaking of individuals but of the Church. No one can be Orthodox apart from the ecclesial body. The Church recognizes Chalcedon (as well as St. Leo) as fully Orthodox. They were not "corrected" by a later council or by an orthodox interpretation of some originally Nestorian documents. No Orthodox Christians can accept such a notion without undermining the entire history and succession of their Church. If Chalcedon was heretical, the Church is heretical, or at the very least has lost its Apostolic Succession. "You were heretical once but not anymore" is not a basis for any honest unity. "You were heretical once but now some of you aren't" is even worse. I simply do not understand the push for unity before so many serious issues are even addressed.


I think the oneness of faith rather varies according to individuals.

There is no faith apart from the Body of Christ. Irrespective of some individual opinions, the Orthodox Church as a whole holds a single faith which is the same faith as was pronounced at the Council of Chalcedon.


What the historical status of orthodoxy of certain councils and individuals is another matter; having some elements of heresy in one's tradition would not necessarily preclude any individual being orthodox themselves.

This individualist approach to orthodoxy, it seems to me, has more in common with a Protestant ecclesiology than with the tradition of either the Orthodox or monophysite churches. If one were to take these ideas to a logical conclusion, then the "orthodox" individuals can leave their respective communions and form a third church of their own.

If the Council of Chalcedon is heretical, and the Church, as a whole, upheld it as a standard of the faith for these past 1500 years, then the entire Church is heretical and deprived of grace. I see something profoundly dishonest when the monophysites seek union without acknowledging this and without demanding that we reject St. Leo.

I think Fr. John Romanides was right when he sensed some trickery at work here.


Are you sure? There are almost always qualifiers associated with such condemnations explaining exactly what shade of "monophysitism" or "monothelitism" (or what not) that they are speaking of.

"Wherefore, if in no respect the difference of the natures of our Lord
Jesus Christ has been taken away, it is necessary that we preserve this same difference in all its proprieties. For whoso teaches that the difference is in no respect to be taken away, declares that it must be preserved in all things. But when the heretics and the followers of heretics say that there is but one will and one operation, how is this difference recognized? While if it is asserted that there is but one will in him (which is absurd), those who make this assertion must needs say that that will is either human or divine, or else composite from both, mixed and confused, or (according to the teaching of all heretics) that Christ has one will and one operation, proceeding from his one composite nature (as they hold)"

I do not see how any assertion of one will is compatible with the Holy Fathers of the Sixth Ecumenical Council.

Not having access to sources by Severus, I would be curious if you could provide pertinent quotes on this subject.

[Christopher Dombrowski]

That may be, but todays "monophysites" denounce eutyches and appolinarius and proclaim one being, the word incarnate has united in himself humanity and divinity without change or mixture or separation, and that the divine and human substances retain all their proper properties in the one incarnate word. What is more orthodox than that? That is what Chalcedon was saying, but was butchering philosophical terms that led to confusion. I am not saying there have never been monophysites; but to be Monophysite n the historical sense is to be a Eutychian, and I know that both the Ethiopians and the Copts anathematize Eutyches...

These figures were anathematized rather early on. The OO ratified the First Council of Constantinople as the Second Ecumenical Council shortly after Chalcedon. At the First Council of Ephesus Cyril constantly specified that he believed that Christ had a rational soul. At the Second Council of Ephesus, Dioscorus readmitted Eutyches to communion only after he submitted a new confession, which included the words: " For He who is the Word of God came down from Heaven without flesh and was made flesh from the very flesh of the Virgin, unchangeably and incontrovertibly, in a way He Himself knew and willed. And He who is always perfect God before the ages was also made perfect man in the end of days for us and for our salvation." At Chalcedon Dioscorus admitted that if Eutyches had returned to his heresies that he ought to be condemned. Finally, in 475, at what was called the Third Council of Ephesus, was attended by ~500 bishops (mostly explicitly Non-Chalcedonian), and presided over by Patrich Timothy Aelurus of Alexandria, Eutyches was formally condemned by the Oriental Orthodox churches who continue to hold to this synod.




But I agree moe with my oo friend, this is a clumsy formulation.

Like I said, the most recent sacramental community I was a member of was the EOC. I may be OO in views, opinions, and perspectives but I am not yet ecclesiastically a member of the OOC.

[Daniel Smith]

So the next question is: can we divide personal being into parts; namely person and nature, ego and substance and prosopon and ousia?

Can we say hypostasis is prosopon united to ousia?

[Daniel Smith]

The DIvine Cyril of Alexandria on the oneness of the INcarnate Word's Nature: Cyril is "A" taken from
Cyril of Alexandria

THAT CHRIST IS ONE
by way of dispute with Hermias

...
B. Therefore (they say) consubstantial with the Word was His body, for thus and no otherwise will He be deemed One Only Son.

A. Yet how is not this now raving and clear proof of a mind wandering? for how can one behold in sameness of essence things so far removed one from another in respect of their nature? for one thing is Godhead, and another manhood. For of what do we say that the Union was made? for a person will not say that the things united are one in number, but either (it may be) two or more.

B. We must therefore sever (they say) the things named.

A. We must not sever (as I said) into a several diversity, in regard I mean to their being away from each other and apart, but must rather bring them together into an indissoluble union. For the Word has been made flesh, as John saith.

B. Have they therefore been confused and both become one nature?

A. But who will be thus distraught and unlearned as to suppose that either the Divine Nature of the Word has been turned into what it was not, or that the flesh went over by way of change into the Nature of the Word Himself (for it is impossible)? but we say that One is the SON and One His Nature even though He be conceived of as having assumed flesh with a rational soul. For His (as I said) hath the human nature been made, and He is conceived of by us none otherwise than thus, God alike and man.

B. There will then be not two natures, of God and of man?

A. Godhead and manhood are one thing and another, according to the mode [of being] existing in each, yet in Christ have they come together, in unwonted wise and passing understanding, unto union, without confusion and turning 18 (http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/cyril_christ_is_one_01_text.htm#18). But wholly incomprehensible is the mode of the Union.

B. And how out of two things, Godhead and manhood, will One Christ be conceived of?

A. In no other wise (I suppose) than that whereby the things brought together one to another unto a union indissoluble and above comprehension will
be One.

B. As for example?

A. Do we not say that a man like us is One and his nature one, although he has not simpleness [of nature] but is compounded out of two, I mean soul and body?

B. We do.

A. Does anybody, taking anew the flesh apart by itself, and sundering from it the soul that was united to it, divide a single person into two and not thereby destroy the right description of him?

[Christopher Dombrowski]

So the next question is: can we divide personal being into parts; namely person and nature, ego and substance and prosopon and ousia?

Can we say hypostasis is prosopon united to ousia?

On a certain level I suppose this would be correct, at least if we were to speak of personal beings. Non-human animals are generally conceived of as non-personal, making them non-prosopic. Yet hypostasis is generally understood as "subsistence" or "individuated substance", i.e. the concrete and particular existence of a common substance. Other creatures therefore may be understood as hypostatic while being understood as not being prosopic.

The most basic meaning of hypostasis is the particular individuation of a common substance. Yet simply this does not cover the Patristic meaning of the word, because if it did then there could be absolutely no objection to there being two hypostases in Christ. Rather, hypostasis is also existential beyond simple substance and it also has an individual or self associated with it, it has a personal aspect. When we understand hypostasis then as the concrete and substantial self or individual or subject we then come to understand what the Fathers meant by hypostasis and realize why we cannot confess two hypostases in Christ because to do so would be Nestorian.

On this level, if we conceive of prosopon as being the self as theoretically separate from substance and the ousia being the substances theoretically separate from "selfness" then we can conceive of the theandric hypostasis as being the combination of the Word with His uncreated divinity and His created humanity.

[Daniel Smith]

ACtually I have been reading Severus of Antioch, and his take is that Prosopon is the COncreteness of the Hypostasis, or in his words, after the ousia is individuated, it is then identified as hypostatic, and then the hypostasis receives its prosopon.

WHen I read that, I hear this: God: COmmon Ousia. Trinity, Tri-Hypostatic Subject. THe Word, an Hypostasis of the Trinity. The Word is then Incarnate, uniting to himself the physis/hypostasis of man and making it one with his own hypostasis., THen the WOrd Incarnate receives his Prosopon. WOuld this be his physical body, his actual physical being and real tangible existence in the world, moving away from theorizing about the INcarnate Hypostatic WOrd to realizing his tangibility/reality?

BEcause it seems somehow connected to physicality: A parsopic union would be saying in this sense that Word is In the BOdy of the Son of David who has been taken up and engodded by him, THerefore the Union iS merely the Physical Being we have before us. SOrt of like a temple with all these different parts and things in it, or a box, and the only real unity parsopically, is the one box which everything is within, right?

[Daniel Smith]

having had time to reflect on the three major Christological traditions, I feel I have arrived at a legitimate understanding: The Nestorians and the Eutychians do not go far enough in their explanations. THey hang their entire argument on one or two key phrases of one or two authors or one or two principles and BAM! Extrapolation...

For Example:

1. Nestorian ( I think we can all condemn this position unless some Assyrian or Chaldean wants to object): Christ is Two Hypostases united by a single prosopon (concrete subsistent reality, the physical and mental form of the son of God). He is one Prosopon in two hypostasis. The Son of Man was taken up by the word and made a part of his being in an ineffable union.
"One nature of God the Word incarnate." St. Cyril.

2. Classic monophysitism: Christ is one hypostasis: a union was made of the hypostasis of the word with the humam hypostatsis, a union without confusion or division. So there is now a true hypostatic UNION. The one being of the word incarnate retains all the properties of true divinity without diminishment, and all the properties of true humanity without diminishment. Since he is one Divine being, he has one divine will, for he willed singly, not severally.

3. Chalcedon: Christ is One Person from and in two natures. The natures are united not merely to his personality in the abstract but to his divine being in totality without confusion, mixture division or separation. He exists as one person in two natures, meaning he is a being with all the properties of both natures in him without change. Those that are proper to humanity are human, those proper to divinity are divine, but it is one Hypostasis, one Christ who performs all. The communication of idioms is in effect.

So the main trouble seems to be that both the nestorian and the monophysite do not go far enough. "Christ is one person in two natures." Nestorius could say thus, but chalcedon continues "...That have been united in one hypostasis of the Word Incarnate. Thus all acts attributable to the word, those proper to humanity and those proper to divinity are performed by one hypostatic being, the Word incarnate."

"THere is one nature of the word incarnate." Ephesus and Chalcedon affirm thus, however they continue that this nature is not a composite or a mixture or a third product of two opposed substances, it is a True hypostatic union of two distinct natures with specific and distinct propertiers, but THEY HAVE come together IN THE ONE BEING OF CHRIST in an hypostatic union.

SO, "in two natures" followed up by "THat are united in one hypostasis"....where is the real objection? WE do not stop at "In two natures." But follow through. It is Nestorius WHo stops. We do not stop at "One nature of the word incarnate." It is APpolinarius and Eutyches who stop.